President-elect Donald Trump seen during an event with the Economic Club of Chicago on October 15. [AP]
The genuine surprise is not that Donald Trump has been re-elected. Almost every non-partisan analyst of American politics could feel it in the air, even if they enjoyed their coffee at Proxenou Koromila in downtown Thessaloniki instead of Dupont Circle. While Trump seemed very confident, Kamala Harris seemed very happy. Happier than a confident politician should be. It was also evident during the last week when Obama took over, and Kamala Harris kept her happy posture. The genuine surprise came when the Republicans made an easy win over the majority in the Senate, controlling the two chambers of Congress, revealing that it was not just Kamala who lost but the Democratic Party too, from the East to the West.
What does this mean for the US? First, Trump’s ultra-Jacksonianism will re-emerge, and the awkward yet famous MAGA slogan will be at the very center of the new presidency’s rhetoric. This has two legs. On the one hand, the Western economy will be under tremendous pressure due to the re-emergence of American protectionism. This will mainly affect the European economy, particularly the ΕU commercial balance. However, this may also push the European leaders to comprehend at an unprecedented delay that the Union will not be able to survive as a mere currency pact and that a genuine deepening in the economic process is obligatory.
On the other hand, American foreign policy will aspire to follow a much more reserved approach to limit any exposure in the international arena. However, this was also seen during the Biden administration in Afghanistan and even during the Obama administration in the Middle East. The critical question is how this ultra-Jacksonian approach will affect the United States’ role as the leading power of the Free World. To put my two cents in, Trump’s administration will not be able to implement a reserved international approach because, as one of the principal doctrines of international relations theory argues, Great Powers cannot just go home without first facing a decisive defeat. Since the US is still the strongest nation from the point of hard power, the most influential from the point of soft power, and the most affluent economically at an international level, and in particular compared with China, this kind of defeat does not seem possible.
A safe prediction is that the Trump administration will be able to enhance the American presence in the Middle East
In contrast, the emergence of a new polarity configuration at a systemic level, that of bipolar multilateralism, will pressure the Trump administration to implement a more vigorous foreign policy in the international environment. A safe prediction is that the Trump administration will be able to enhance the American presence in the Middle East, especially with Israel and the Gulf states, since the political elites there have openly shown that it is much more preferable for them to communicate with Trump where terms, scopes and goals are much more straightforward, sometimes even simplistic, but never obscure. This will allow the US to turn things around in the region and limit the growing Chinese influence there.
Regarding the balance of power in Southeast Europe, Trump has a good connection with Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdogan mainly because they see international politics through a Thucydidean, if not Hobbesian, kaleidoscope. This does not make the former a pro-Turkish president, though. Suppose the Maximos Mansion in Athens aspires to establish an open communication channel with the new White House and Foggy Bottom. In that case, it must start reading more John J. Mearsheimer and Kenneth Waltz and less Norman Angell or John Rawls. For everything else, we Greeks will always have Thucydides and Aristotle.
Spyridon N. Litsas is professor of international relations theory at the University of Macedonia. His latest book is “Smart Instead of Small in International Relations Theory: The Case of the United Arab Emirates,” by Springer.