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The Hellenic Hydrocarbons and Energy Resources Management Company (HEREMA) believes there are at least nine locations with strong potential for commercially viable deposits in the area south of Crete that Chevron is seeking to explore.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n
What has been going on with Chevron and Greece\u2019s hydrocarbon deposits?<\/strong><\/p>\n Chevron is the second (after ExxonMobil) American energy giant to show an interest in hydrocarbon deposits in the Greek continental shelf. The company is already active in other parts of the Mediterranean, heading the consortium seeking to exploit Cyprus\u2019 Aphrodite gas field, managing Israel\u2019s massive Leviathan field and carrying out surveys for natural gas deposits in Egypt\u2019s exclusive economic zone. In January, Chevron expressed interest in exploring the block located between the Peloponnese and Crete (the \u201cSouth of Peloponnese\u201d block) and on March 26, the company announced that it is also interested in two offshore blocks south of Crete (\u201cSouth Crete 1\u201d and \u201cSouth Crete 2\u201d).<\/p>\n Does this effectively nullify the 2019 Turkish-Libyan maritime delineation agreement?<\/strong><\/p>\n The arbitrary boundary of the Turkish-Libyan agreement is located slightly east of the blocks eyed by Chevron. It is more correct to say that Chevron\u2019s proposal effectively nullifies Turkey\u2019s so-called \u201cBlue Homeland\u201d doctrine in the entire area south of Crete. The maps drawn up by Turkey illustrating this doctrine depict the area south of Crete as belonging, in the most part, to Libya, with a smaller part assigned to Turkey. All of these imaginary \u201cTurkish\u201d and \u201cLibyan\u201d areas are part of the \u201cSouth Crete 1\u201d and \u201cSouth Crete 2\u201d blocks that Chevron seeks to explore and exploit \u2013 thus putting a lid on any claims that Turkey or Libya may have south of Crete.<\/p>\n Does Chevron\u2019s request have any broader ramifications for the Greek islands?<\/strong><\/p>\n It fundamentally undercuts the Turkish theory that Greek islands have no continental shelf or exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of their own. According to the \u201cBlue Homeland\u201d doctrine, islands lose their right to a continental shelf and EEZ when they are located within 200 nautical miles of mainland coasts. Since several Greek islands lie less than 200 nautical miles from the Turkish and Libyan mainland coasts, Turkey argues that they cannot claim their own continental shelf or EEZ. These maritime zones, it claims, should instead be divided between Turkey and Libya. However, the maritime area Chevron seeks to explore belongs exclusively to Greece, based solely on the legal maritime entitlements of the island of Crete, not the Greek mainland coast.<\/p>\n How did we get to where we are today?<\/strong><\/p>\n Greece has little experience in searching for and producing hydrocarbons. Law 4001\/2011, or the so-called Maniatis Law, was a game changer. It stipulated, in Article 156, that in the absence of a delimitation agreement with neighboring countries, the outer limit of the Greek continental shelf is defined by the median line\/equidistant line, measured from both mainland and island coasts. This was a groundbreaking approach to addressing the lack of delimitation agreements with Greece\u2019s neighbors. The legislation paved the way for an international public invitation to be issued for seismic surveys within the continental shelves of the Ionian and Cretan seas. A Norwegian firm took up the invitation in 2012-2013 and the information collected from those surveys was sold to companies interested in hydrocarbon exploration. Exploration and exploitation rights for hydrocarbons in 20 offshore areas in the Ionian Sea and south of Crete were then put to an international tender in 2014 (Government Gazette Issue B 2186\/8.8.2014). Several companies expressed interest in specific offshore areas in 2017, though the Greek state did not produce the strategic environmental impact studies until 2019. In October of that same year, Parliament ratified the concession agreements for the areas west and southwest of Crete with the consortium of Exxon Mobil and Helleniq. Surveys were then put on hold because of the Covid pandemic, while delays on the part of the Greek state prompted several companies to abandon their plans. Greece now has to make up for about a decade\u2019s worth of lost time.<\/p>\n The Hellenic Hydrocarbons and Energy Resources Management Company has estimated that the total value of Greece\u2019s hydrocarbon reserves in the Ionian Sea and south of Crete come to \u20ac250 billion\u00a0<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n Why is Chevron interested in these particular blocks?<\/strong><\/p>\n In March 2010, the US Geological Survey estimated that there are 122 trillion cubic feet of natural gas and 1.7 billion barrels of oil in the Eastern Mediterranean. If confirmed, these quantities could meet Europe\u2019s energy needs for the next 30 years. Since then, significant deposits have been discovered, including Egypt\u2019s Zohr field and Israel\u2019s Leviathan. The Hellenic Hydrocarbons and Energy Resources Management Company (HEREMA) has subsequently estimated that the total value of Greece\u2019s hydrocarbon reserves in the Ionian Sea and south of Crete come to \u20ac250 billion. There are believed to be at least nine locations with strong potential for commercially viable deposits in the area south of Crete that Chevron is seeking to explore.<\/p>\n Isn\u2019t the search for fossil fuels an obsolete notion in this day and age?<\/strong><\/p>\n Like Europe as a whole, Greece wants to achieve zero carbon emissions by 2050. Until then, however, we need fossil fuels to produce energy, and natural gas is the preferred fuel for this transition internationally. When burned to produce electricity, natural gas emits less carbon dioxide, sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides than oil, and it does not produce soot. In 2023, Greece imported 67.71 terawatt-hours (TWh) of natural gas to meet its energy needs, with its main suppliers being the United States, Russia and Azerbaijan. Consuming domestically produced natural gas is, without any doubt, better for Greece than relying on imports. One crucial question that needs answering is what Greece\u2019s stance will be if oil is also found during the search for natural gas. Will exploitation be permitted? Environmentally sensitive Norway says \u201cyes,\u201d as the state-run Equinor continues to look for gas and oil deposits it can tap. Its most recent discovery of oil, Ringand, was made in December 2024.<\/p>\n What comes next?<\/strong><\/p>\n Some of the blocks Chevron is eyeing south of Crete are within the boundaries included in the 2014 tender. The block south of the Peloponnese is a new addition. Therefore, the basic terms of the concession will need to be announced and other interested parties will also have the opportunity to submit bids through an international tender. It is important to note that the strategic environmental impact studies for the areas south of Crete that Chevron is pursuing were approved in July 2020. This eliminates a significant amount of red tape, though legal challenges from environmental organizations are almost certain to follow. At that stage, a government initiative will be necessary to ensure that the judicial process is expedited. A similar legal challenge against the concession of the offshore areas \u201cSouthwest Crete\u201d and \u201cWest Crete\u201d was filed in May 2019, and the decision from the Council of State was issued in November 2022 (Decision No. 2462).<\/p>\n What conclusions can we draw from developments so far?<\/strong><\/p>\n The first key conclusion concerns the de facto rejection of the notion that Greece\u2019s rights over its continental shelf are not exercised automatically (even though international law stipulates they exist ipso facto and ab initio). The assumption is that for these rights to be exercised, there needs to be a delimitation agreement with neighboring countries. Until then, Greece only has claims. For the offshore \u201cSouthwest Crete,\u201d \u201cWest Crete,\u201d \u201cSouth Crete 1\u201d and \u201cSouth Crete 2\u201d blocks, there is no delineation agreement with Libya. A very small part of \u201cSouth Crete 2\u201d has been delineated with Egypt, hence the small tooth-like projection on the relevant map. A delineation agreement is always good, but it is not essential for Greece to exercise its rights. The second conclusion concerns the official maps published by the Greek state.<\/p>\n The 2011 invitation for seismic surveys included an indicative map showing the boundaries of Greece\u2019s continental shelf in the specified areas (Official Journal of the European Union C2011\/353\/09). Interestingly, Turkey has, to some extent, respected this map. The boundary outlined in the Turkey-Libya memorandum did not cross the limits set out in the 2011 map. This also helps foreign investors clearly understand where they can invest. As a result, the issue of submitting Greece\u2019s full continental shelf boundaries to the United Nations is brought back to the fore. Greece is, after all, obligated to do as much under Law 4001\/2011.<\/p>\n Angelos Syrigos is an associate professor of international law and foreign policy at the Panteion University of Athens, and an MP with ruling New Democracy.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n\n