\n<\/p>\n
H\u00fcrriyet focuses on the missiles. T\u00fcrkiye frames the drill as a challenge and links it to a scenario published in the Greek daily Ta Nea. Milliyet\u2019s editor, \u00d6zay \u015eendir, tries to widen the argument into strategy, asking what would follow the first day of any clash. Takvim, separately, folds Greece into the Turkey\u2013Libya\u2013Israel contest in the Eastern Mediterranean.<\/p>\n
T\u00fcrkiye connects \u201cAlexandros\u201d to Ta Nea\u2019s hypothetical \u201cpre-emptive strike\u201d scenario. According to the Turkish account, the Greek army ran an exercise under that name in which it tested landings on small islets and uninhabited rocky outcrops, including a night seizure. Special forces were moved toward several areas. Units on the Evros and on the islands were placed on full readiness. About 70 combat aircraft were mobilised. The report claims units could take on a mission within five minutes.<\/p>\n
H\u00fcrriyet, citing the Greek site Onalert, reports that Greece has already fielded SPIKE NLOS systems on some islands, with further deliveries to be rolled out gradually in the eastern Aegean and on the Evros. Deliveries are described as ongoing, with a large share of the order expected by the end of the year. The same Turkish press cycle treats \u201cAlexandros,\u201d and its landing scenarios on islets and rocks, as a parallel Greek\u2013Turkish story. Takvim ran a separate Libya and Eastern Mediterranean piece that also brings Greece in.<\/p>\n
The sharper political reading comes from Milliyet editor \u00d6zay \u015eendir, returning to the Ta Nea report on a hypothetical Greek first strike. He asks whether Athens really has such a plan, and answers: \u201cFirst of all, does Athens have such a plan? Yes, it does.\u201d<\/p>\n
\u015eendir reads not only the scenario but the leak itself. He notes that the Greek piece is signed by journalist Marinos Gkasiamis and claims the writer is linked to Hellenic National Defence General Staff chief Konstantinos Houpis and other \u201chardline\u201d officers. What stands out, he argues, is that a carefully designed military scheme appeared in public at all. War plans, he writes, do not leak easily unless networks exist \u201cwhose strings are pulled from the United States\u201d \u2014 a reference to the G\u00fclen movement, FET\u00d6, in Turkish official language.<\/p>\n
He also argues the leak did not happen despite Defence Minister Nikos Dendias, but could serve Dendias\u2019s political ambitions. He points to Greek journalist Alexandra Fotaki, whom he presents as especially close to the minister, citing her role on international panels and exclusive interviews with him.<\/p>\n
On the logic he attributes to Greek defence planning, \u015eendir writes: strike Turkey quickly, call in Western allies, and sit down to negotiate with an advantage over Ankara. The question that organises his column follows from there. A plan that looks sound on paper in Athens still leaves Ankara asking who stops Turkey at the 25th hour, after a first day in which Greece is supposed to hold the military edge.<\/p>\n
\u015eendir then tests whether outside powers could impose a ceasefire. Brussels, he says, already has no leverage over Ankara. The United States, in his view, could not take diplomatic steps without asking who started the attack, though he expects Washington would still press for a ceasefire. He asks why Russia, a permanent member of the UN Security Council, would rush to halt a fight between two NATO allies, and how far Britain would risk its ties with Turkey merely so Greece could reach the table ahead. He adds a further hypothetical: what if the Security Council meets late, or issues a ceasefire call that takes effect only after 48 hours?<\/p>\n
\u015eendir then turns to General Houpis, arguing that since taking office he has used aggressive language toward Turkey, and that \u201cthis problematic language and this wishful thinking do not benefit Greece.\u201d Turkish chiefs of staff, he says, avoid threatening statements about Greece. He names Turkish General Staff chief Sel\u00e7uk Bayraktaro\u011flu and writes that those who serve their states do not personalise issues, and remember that what they say binds their country. Turkish chiefs, he adds, do not opine on matters of political will, such as which subjects the two countries will negotiate. Messages, in his telling, go out through action, not speeches. As an example he cites the \u201cSea Wolf\u201d exercise, in which, he writes, different kamikaze unmanned underwater vehicles were used for the first time.<\/p>\n
The column closes on the Greece\u2013Israel military relationship. \u015eendir says the ties Houpis has built with Israel, the briefings he has received, and bases opened to Israel are not unknown. He then refers to former chief Konstantinos Floros and makes claims about Greek intelligence monitoring Floros\u2019s communications; the SigmaLive report notes that those claims are presented as fact without evidence in the excerpt. \u015eendir ends with an indirect nod to past Greek\u2013Turkish wars, saying there are \u201ceven more cautionary examples\u201d of what happened to Greece when it \u201cwent to war with Turkey or sought war,\u201d but that he will not expand on them so as not to affect efforts at friendship.<\/p>\n
Takvim writes that British, Greek and Israeli reporting is again examining the 2019 Turkey\u2013Libya memorandum and the effect of Turkey\u2019s military and diplomatic presence in Libya on the Eastern Mediterranean. The paper argues that presence narrows Israel\u2019s room for manoeuvre and affects plans for energy links from Israel to Europe via Cyprus and Greece.<\/p>\n
READ MORE: New Greek fortifications on the Evros and in the eastern Aegean<\/strong>.<\/p>\n