{"id":22734,"date":"2026-10-02T02:41:09","date_gmt":"2026-10-02T02:41:09","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/in-greece.com\/index.php\/2026\/10\/02\/what-it-means-for-greece-greek-city-times\/"},"modified":"2026-10-02T02:41:09","modified_gmt":"2026-10-02T02:41:09","slug":"what-it-means-for-greece-greek-city-times","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/in-greece.com\/index.php\/2026\/10\/02\/what-it-means-for-greece-greek-city-times\/","title":{"rendered":"What It Means for Greece \u2013 Greek City Times"},"content":{"rendered":"


\n<\/p>\n

\n

ATHENS \u2014 Finland has become the tenth European partner in President Emmanuel Macron\u2019s nuclear deterrence initiative. Latvia has asked to join. Greece accepted Paris\u2019s invitation in March, the only country from NATO\u2019s <\/a>southern flank.<\/h2>\n

The question for Athens is what that participation means, and what it does not.<\/p>\n

Russian nuclear threats and doubt about US guarantees have pushed European governments toward the French arsenal. Paris wants partners\u2019 security tied more closely to its own, without giving up freedom of action. Macron set out a doctrine of \u201cforward deterrence\u201d on 2 March at the \u00cele Longue submarine base.<\/p>\n

The first group included the United Kingdom, Germany, Poland, the Netherlands, Belgium, Greece, Sweden and Denmark. Norway joined in May and Finland on 14 September.<\/p>\n

Paris keeps the trigger<\/h3>\n

Macron was explicit: \u201cThere will be no sharing of the final decision\u201d on nuclear use. Planning and execution stay French. So does the definition of France\u2019s \u201cvital interests,\u201d which Paris says have a European dimension but will not spell out.<\/p>\n

That vagueness is part of the deterrent. Moscow must now reckon with a possible French response as well as an American or British one. London takes part as a nuclear power. The Northwood Declaration of July 2025 provides for coordination of the two arsenals and a joint steering group.<\/p>\n

France\u2019s stockpile was about 290 warheads in 2025, carried in part by Rafale aircraft with ASMPA-R cruise missiles, due to be replaced around 2035 by the ASN4G. At \u00cele Longue, Macron said the number of warheads would rise and would no longer be published. He called French weapons strictly strategic. The air-launched missiles are widely treated as tactical in effect \u2014 a gap in the doctrine.<\/p>\n

Allies may support French missions with conventional forces. French strategic aircraft may be deployed temporarily on partner territory. No permanent stationing of nuclear weapons has been announced.<\/p>\n

For France, dispersal makes a surprise strike harder. For a host, French aircraft on its soil raise the chance that an attack would hit French forces and pull Paris in.<\/p>\n

North first, south second<\/h3>\n

Germany and France have a nuclear coordination group and talks on doctrine, missile defence and conventional forces. Berlin stays in NATO nuclear planning and gains a channel to the EU\u2019s only nuclear-armed state. Poland\u2019s priority is a Russian attack. Sweden and Denmark focus on the Baltic, offering air power, surveillance and air defence without their own bombs. Norway and Finland want consultations before any use, and both refuse peacetime stationing. The Netherlands and Belgium already host US weapons and sit in NATO planning; the French track is an extra channel.<\/p>\n

Greece<\/h3>\n

Greek participation gives the scheme a foothold in south-eastern Europe and adds weight to the existing Greek\u2013French defence agreement. Public commitments do not amount to an automatic French nuclear guarantee in a Greek\u2013Turkish crisis. The umbrella is aimed first at Russia.<\/p>\n

Athens will have to turn the invitation into exercises, support missions and bilateral deals. Early warning, missile defence, surveillance and long-range conventional strike are the practical fields. What Greece needs from Paris is a clear role for its forces, access to intelligence, and a picture of French support in a crisis involving Russia.<\/p>\n

Oliver Meier, writing in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, notes that separate bilateral talks put Paris at the centre, with each partner negotiating alone \u2014 and with uneven access and transparency.<\/p>\n

Participation does not buy a vote. Whether French vital interests are at stake remains a decision for the \u00c9lys\u00e9e. Partners take on cost, commit forces and may put infrastructure at greater risk, without an equal say.<\/p>\n