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Turkish analysts have described the new \u20ac3 billion defence agreement between Greece and Israel as part of a broader strategic alignment in the Eastern Mediterranean, arguing that the strengthening of military cooperation could affect Turkey\u2019s security interests.<\/p>\n
The agreement, signed in Tel Aviv on Monday, forms a central part of Greece\u2019s \u201cAchilles Shield\u201d programme, which aims to create a multi layered air and missile defence network.<\/p>\n
Speaking to HaberT\u00fcrk, political analyst Ogtyun Orhan said the growing cooperation between Greece and Israel was driven largely by what he described as a shared perception of regional threats.<\/p>\n
According to Orhan, Turkey has not been explicitly named in the latest agreement, but he argued that previous contacts between Israeli, Greek and Cypriot leaders had frequently referred to Turkey and regional competition.<\/p>\n
He said Israel\u2019s security cooperation with the Republic of Cyprus, the new defence agreement with Greece and developments in Syria should all be viewed within the wider strategic environment of the Eastern Mediterranean.<\/p>\n
Ece Baban, a professor at Beykent University, similarly argued that the agreement should not be viewed solely as an air and missile defence project.<\/p>\n
She said the deepening cooperation between Greece, the Republic of Cyprus and Israel had developed through a series of bilateral and trilateral contacts focused on regional security, opportunities and threats.<\/p>\n
Baban said the \u201cAchilles Shield\u201d could also contribute to technology and know how transfers, making it strategically significant beyond the acquisition of individual weapons systems.<\/p>\n
From a Turkish perspective, she said, the developing Greek Israeli relationship and the emphasis on energy security could contribute to what she described as a new security framework in the Eastern Mediterranean.<\/p>\n
Sozcu TV also presented the agreement as a development that Ankara should closely monitor.<\/p>\n
Presenter Ozlem Gyures said the scale of the \u20ac3 billion agreement made it particularly significant, arguing that the cooperation between Greece and Israel could develop into a greater security challenge for Turkey.<\/p>\n
The Turkish broadcaster reported that the agreement includes four separate arrangements covering short, medium and long range defence systems, alongside a \u20ac9 million supplementary agreement for protection against unmanned aerial systems.<\/p>\n
The package is part of Greece\u2019s broader military modernisation programme, which is expected to continue through 2036. Greece is also pursuing the acquisition of F 35 fighter aircraft from the United States and new frigates from European suppliers.<\/p>\n
Turkey has closely monitored Greece\u2019s defence modernisation efforts, particularly amid longstanding disagreements between the two countries over issues in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean.<\/p>\n
Meanwhile, Hurriyet focused on the technological aspects of the agreement, describing the deal as significant amid continuing disagreements between Greece and Turkey over maritime boundaries, territorial waters and other Aegean issues.<\/p>\n
Hurriyet political analyst Nilg\u00fcn Tekfidan G\u00fcm\u00fc\u015f said Greece had chosen Israel rather than European defence companies for the project as Athens seeks to strengthen its strategic partnerships in the Eastern Mediterranean.<\/p>\n
She also claimed that Israel had agreed to provide Greece with access to source code for certain weapons systems, potentially allowing the Greek armed forces to modify and update their software.<\/p>\n
The reported agreement represents another major step in Greece and Israel\u2019s expanding defence relationship, while Turkish media and analysts are examining its potential implications for the regional balance of power.<\/p>\n
The Greek government has presented the \u201cAchilles Shield\u201d primarily as part of its effort to strengthen the country\u2019s air and missile defence capabilities. Turkish analysts, however, increasingly view the programme through the prism of the wider strategic competition in the Eastern Mediterranean.<\/p>\n