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As Sankalp Gurjar observed in his analysis originally published on Geopolitical Monitor on 25 August 2026, the clearest expression of this shift appeared in early August, when Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan signed the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement.<\/p>\n
The pact is frequently described as a NATO-style arrangement. Echoing Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, it declares that an armed attack on any one of the three signatories will be treated as an attack on all of them. It also commits the parties to broader defence cooperation. The full text of the agreement has not been released publicly.<\/p>\n
The announcement caught many observers by surprise. U.S. President Donald Trump publicly welcomed the deal, stating he was \u201cvery happy\u201d to see Middle Eastern countries \u201ccoming together\u201d and becoming better able to defend themselves.<\/p>\n
There are clear reasons why the three countries found common ground. All maintain close security ties with the United States and operate substantial inventories of American military equipment. All also face Iran as a near neighbour: Pakistan on its eastern border, Turkey to the northwest, and Saudi Arabia across the Gulf. Each has experienced periods of tension with Tehran. In 2024, for instance, Pakistan and Iran exchanged strikes linked to the Baluchistan issue.<\/p>\n
Bilateral relationships among the three have already been strengthening. Pakistan and Saudi Arabia concluded their own defence agreement in 2025 and have long maintained particularly close ties. Pakistan and Turkey have drawn closer in recent years; during the brief 2025 conflict with India, Pakistan employed Turkish drones. The Saudi-Turkish rapprochement is more unexpected, given the serious diplomatic rupture that followed the 2018 killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi, yet it illustrates how fluid regional alignments have become.<\/p>\n
Soon after the agreement was signed, discussion turned to possible expansion. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan indicated that the pact need not remain limited to three members and that other countries could eventually join under the same umbrella. He emphasised that the arrangement is not directed against any specific state, including Iran, and does not replace existing alliances. Egypt has been mentioned as the most probable next member. Fidan noted that the three countries already behave toward one another as if they were alliance partners, and he expressed the view that Egypt would join at a later stage.<\/p>\n
Despite the initial momentum, several fundamental questions cast doubt on the agreement\u2019s long-term durability.<\/p>\n
A lasting military alliance typically rests on a shared threat perception. NATO was created to counter the Soviet Union. In the Mecca grouping, the primary threats diverge: for Saudi Arabia it is Iran; for Turkey it is Israel; for Pakistan it is India. It is unclear how the parties would respond if one of them were attacked by its main rival, or whether the collective-defence clause would actually be invoked. The agreement provides for consultations, but consultations alone may prove insufficient in a crisis.<\/p>\n
The picture is further complicated by the fact that some members maintain close relations with the adversaries of others. Saudi Arabia has significantly deepened ties with India over the past decade. Would Riyadh side with Pakistan in a future confrontation with New Delhi? Historical precedent is not encouraging. When Saudi Arabia previously requested Pakistani military support for its campaign in Yemen, Pakistan\u2019s parliament declined to authorise participation. National interests ultimately determine decisions about war and peace, raising doubts about the reliability of mutual assistance and the scale of any help that might be offered.<\/p>\n
Successful alliances also require clear leadership. In NATO, the United States has long filled that role. In the Mecca Agreement, each member can claim a form of regional leadership: Saudi Arabia through its economic weight and custodianship of Islam\u2019s holiest sites; Turkey through its Ottoman legacy and status as NATO\u2019s second-largest military power; Pakistan through its position as the only nuclear-armed Muslim-majority state and its founding ideology. No hierarchy has been established.<\/p>\n
Operational structures are equally absent. NATO maintains a headquarters in Brussels and a defined command system. The Mecca signatories have announced no headquarters, no joint command, and no detailed planning mechanisms. Without these elements, the agreement risks remaining a political declaration rather than a functioning military instrument.<\/p>\n
Finally, effective alliances are usually underpinned by a degree of shared political ideology or values. NATO members are democracies that broadly uphold human rights and the rule of law. The Mecca trio lacks such cohesion. Saudi Arabia is a theocratic monarchy pursuing internal reforms while guarding its status as the leading Islamic state. Pakistan is a military-influenced democracy that often uses religion as a policy instrument. Turkey is a constrained democracy that promotes political Islam. Saudi Arabia, for its part, views political Islam\u2014particularly the Muslim Brotherhood\u2014as a direct threat to its regime. These internal contradictions are stark.<\/p>\n
What, then, is likely to hold the Mecca Agreement together? The three states do not share a common threat, a common ideology, or clearly overlapping strategic interests beyond short-term dissatisfaction with American reliability. Once the current conflict involving Iran ends, will the incentive to maintain the pact remain? Might each member instead use the agreement as leverage to extract better terms from other partners?<\/p>\n
The arrangement inevitably recalls the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), the Cold War-era Baghdad Pact that included Turkey, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, and Britain. The United States supported the grouping through bilateral arrangements but never formally joined. CENTO never developed an effective collective-defence capability. Iraq withdrew in 1959, and the organisation dissolved after the 1979 Iranian Revolution. It failed to achieve its original purpose. Whether the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement will follow a similar trajectory remains an open question.<\/p>\n
READ MORE: Turkey Reviews War Scenarios as It Monitors Greece-Israel Military Cooperation<\/strong>.<\/p>\n