\n<\/p>\n
The 2011 ruling by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague against Greece, following an appeal by the then-Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), underscores that the outcome of a case before a judicial body can never be predicted with absolute certainty. This point is highlighted by Maria (Mania) Telalian, the newly appointed director of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) at the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), headquartered in Warsaw, during this interview with Kathimerini.<\/p>\n
Telalian, who served for many years as head of the Legal Department at the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs and has extensive experience in shaping Greece\u2019s legal positions in numerous rounds of Greek-Turkish negotiations, outlines two possible paths forward for resolving disputes: either reaching an agreement through political dialogue between Greece and Turkey or signing an arbitration agreement to seek recourse with a judicial body, which would require approval by the Greek Parliament in any case.<\/p>\n
She also dismisses as unfounded the criticism of Greece\u2019s joint candidacy with former Turkish ambassador Feridun Sinirlioglu, who has been appointed as the new secretary-general of the OSCE. Additionally, Telalian emphasizes that, in the event of an agreement between Russia and Ukraine, the OSCE is expected to play a pivotal role in supporting and facilitating the process.<\/p>\n
You are about to depart for Warsaw to assume your role as ODIHR director. Why is the appointment of a Greek national to this position significant?<\/strong><\/p>\n The office was established 35 years ago under the OSCE\u2019s Copenhagen Document as part of a broader vision to strengthen democracy, democratic institutions, and human rights during a period of critical political and historical change. Initially, its mandate focused on monitoring free and fair elections in OSCE member-states through the deployment of observers. Over time, its scope expanded to address broader issues, including human rights and [individual] liberties, democracy, the rule of law, tolerance and non-discrimination, as well as issues related to Roma and Sinti (a subgroup of the Roma population, primarily residing in Germany) communities. The ODIHR also reviews and evaluates the legislation of OSCE states and monitors the implementation of human rights commitments through monitoring missions. Its work is guided by the OSCE\u2019s politically binding principles and regulations, as articulated in historic documents like the Copenhagen Document, the Moscow Document, and the 1990 Paris Charter. [Greece] has played a pivotal role in shaping these commitments, many of which were later incorporated into legally binding documents, such as the Council of Europe\u2019s Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. Moreover, the ODIHR facilitates dialogue among states and between states and civil society, ensuring that all voices are heard and that rights are upheld. For Greece, this position holds particular significance, as the office\u2019s work remains essential today and is likely to become even more critical in the future.<\/p>\n Much has been said about your joint candidacy with Turkish diplomat Feridun Sinirlioglu, who has taken over as OSCE secretary-general. How was the decision for a joint ticket reached, and what is your response to the criticism?<\/strong><\/p>\n The criticism is unfounded. One of the OSCE\u2019s core objectives is to maintain continuous dialogue and communication among states, even those with long-standing differences. However, due to the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, [this dialogue] had nearly ceased. Electing the secretary-general and the heads of the OSCE\u2019s three independent institutions became impossible. We thought that a joint candidacy by Greece and Turkey could set a positive example. Despite their long-standing differences, these two countries have institutionalized dialogue and cooperation, seeking common ground, mutual understanding, and trust-building measures. Collaborative solutions are always preferable to mutual exclusion, and this approach aligns closely with the OSCE\u2019s principle of cooperative security. Initially, our candidacy was met with surprise by many participating states. There was skepticism. However, once we clarified our objectives, the message was effectively communicated \u2013 considering that decisions within the OSCE are made by consensus. This, of course, does not mean that Greece and Turkey no longer have differences.<\/p>\n So, was the joint candidacy the breakthrough that resolved the OSCE deadlock?<\/strong><\/p>\n \u2018While the individual qualifications of each candidate were important, ours was the only joint candidacy capable of breaking the [OSCE] leadership impasse\u2019<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n Yes, I believe it was. I met with representatives from all 57 OSCE member-states. While the individual qualifications of each candidate were important, ours was the only joint candidacy capable of breaking the leadership impasse. It was seen as a constructive solution that enabled the OSCE to resume its vital functions. Looking ahead, the OSCE may play a critical role in shaping Europe\u2019s new security architecture, particularly if a resolution to the conflict in Ukraine is achieved.<\/p>\n What role could the OSCE play in resolving the Ukraine conflict?<\/strong><\/p>\n If an agreement is reached regarding the Ukraine conflict, it will likely encompass multiple dimensions. The OSCE could play an overarching role as an organization specifically designed to address the security of this region. Within this framework, the ODIHR would hold a particularly significant role in ensuring the operation of resilient and effective democratic institutions while safeguarding human rights and freedoms for all. A cornerstone principle of the OSCE, accepted by all its member-states, is that sustainable security cannot exist without democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. Furthermore, Ukraine falls squarely within the OSCE\u2019s area of responsibility and is of primary concern to the organization and its member-states, as the ongoing war has serious repercussions for their wider region.<\/p>\n You have closely followed the technical discussions on Greek-Turkish differences. Do you believe their nature offers hope for resolution through a legal framework?<\/strong><\/p>\n Greek-Turkish relations have experienced many phases. It is important that the two countries recently institutionalized a dialogue aimed at fostering friendly relations. This involves strengthening the positive agenda, implementing confidence-building measures, and engaging in political dialogue. The latter aims to explore the possibility of substantive negotiations to resolve the dispute over the delimitation of the continental shelf and exclusive economic zone (EEZ), which has been a long-standing goal for Greece. This position is consistent with the Law of the Sea, both in its customary and conventional forms, which obliges states with adjacent or opposite coasts to engage in substantive negotiations for delimiting (overlapping) EEZ\/continental shelf zones. Should these negotiations however fail, the states are obligated to seek resolution through international judicial bodies. Alternatively, they may bypass political negotiation altogether and pursue judicial resolution directly. In any case, issues concerning [Greece\u2019s] sovereignty are neither negotiable nor subject to adjudication by international courts. Greece has repeatedly emphasized that its sovereignty over islands, islets, and rocky formations in the Aegean has been definitively and irrevocably established by the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne and the 1947 Paris Peace Treaties.<\/p>\n So, The Hague or some other form of arbitration?<\/strong><\/p>\n I cannot specify. Whether it will be The Hague or another international judicial body is a decision for the two states to make. I am speaking in general terms. For judicial resolution to occur, negotiations must first begin to draft an arbitration agreement \u2013 a special agreement that precisely outlines the nature of the dispute. This agreement must then be ratified by the Greek Parliament before submission to the court. Traditionally, Greece has expressed a preference for the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague (dating back to 1976). However, as Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis has noted, we remain far from reaching that stage.<\/p>\n You were part of the team defending Greece in The Hague after Skopje took Athens to court for violating the 1995 Interim Accord. What is one key takeaway from that case about the workings of international justice?<\/strong><\/p>\n The case of \u201cThe former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) v. Greece\u201d before the ICJ was an unusual one. It was a unilateral appeal filed by FYROM in 2008, not based on an arbitration agreement but rather on a mandatory jurisdiction clause contained in the 1995 Interim Accord between the two countries. FYROM (now North Macedonia) argued that Greece\u2019s veto of its NATO accession in 2008 violated Greece\u2019s obligation (under Article 11 of the accord), which stipulated that Greece would not obstruct FYROM\u2019s entry into international organizations where Greece was a member. It is worth noting that when Greece signed the Interim Accord in 1995, NATO membership for FYROM was not on the horizon. At the time, the only organization in question was the OSCE. Alongside Ambassador George Savvaidis, I was tasked with defending Greece in this challenging case, which carried a strong political dimension as FYROM was, in essence, seeking an indirect and favorable resolution to the name dispute. Our legal team, made up of leading Greek and international experts, worked diligently during both the written and oral phases of the proceedings. However, the ICJ relied exclusively on the literal interpretation of Article 11 (as well as on certain statements made by Greek politicians), and concluded that Greece, by blocking FYROM\u2019s NATO accession, had violated the article. This decision underscores that the outcome of a case before a judicial body can never be predicted with absolute certainty.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n\n