The Economic Threat to Greece and Europe from China’s AI – Greek City Times


A new source of pressure on the European economy is emerging from China’s rapidly growing technological and export power. Beijing is no longer competing with Europe solely on lower prices. It is claiming ever-larger shares in high-technology and strategically important products, from green technologies and semiconductors to the equipment that enables the development of artificial intelligence.

Two recent analyses, from Fitch Ratings and the European Central Bank, capture different sides of the same challenge. Fitch documents the rising competitiveness of Chinese exports and the strain this places on the European economy, while the ECB highlights the role of state subsidies in strengthening strategic sectors of Chinese industry.

Fitch estimates that external trade, which historically supported growth in the European Union, is expected to become a “drag” on the economy in 2026–2028. Behind this shift lies China’s increasingly strong presence both inside the European market and in third-country markets, where companies from the two economies compete for the same market shares.

An indication of the changing balance is that China’s trade surplus with the EU has now surpassed its surplus with the United States for the first time in 30 years of available data. At the same time, China’s overall trade surplus has reached $1.2 trillion, equivalent to roughly 0.9% of global GDP.

From Low Cost to Technological Superiority

According to Fitch, China’s bilateral real exchange rate against the eurozone has fallen by about 20% since 2019, as producer prices in China remained stagnant or declined while the 2022 energy shock significantly raised costs for European firms.

The bigger problem for Europe, however, is that competition is no longer limited to cost. Fitch finds major improvements in China’s non-price competitiveness, with its exporters expanding rapidly into new product categories, including green technologies and goods that enable the development and operation of AI applications.

China’s export mix is thus overlapping more and more with Europe’s, while the traditional quality advantage of European firms has narrowed or even disappeared in some product categories.

Artificial intelligence is a clear example of this shift. The ECB itself has calculated that the eurozone is a net importer of the goods required to build and operate AI data-center infrastructure, with the related trade deficit rising from 0.2% of GDP in 2024 to nearly 0.3% in 2025, partly due to larger imports from China. AI-related goods already accounted for about 13% of the eurozone’s total goods imports in 2025, compared with roughly 9% of its exports.

The “Weapon” of Chinese Subsidies

The ECB’s new analysis of state aid completes the picture. Using OECD data on 525 large manufacturing firms across 52 countries, the central bank finds that China stands out both in the scale and the breadth of state support for industry.

In 2024, subsidies represented about 2% of Chinese firms’ costs, compared with 1.4% in the United States and just 0.6% in the eurozone. The difference is not only in the amount of support but also in where it is directed.

From 2010 to 2024 China gradually reduced support for more mature sectors and real-estate-related activities such as cement and aluminum, and shifted the weight toward strategic areas including semiconductors, transport, and the chemical industry.

Globally, semiconductors and photovoltaics rank among the sectors with the highest intensity of state support. Over the past five years, subsidies averaged about 3.9% of costs for semiconductor firms and 3.6% for photovoltaics, versus 0.8% in the auto industry. These are sectors at the heart of both the green and digital transitions and form critical parts of the AI supply chain.

How Subsidies Become Exports

Chinese sectors that receive more state support also tend to show larger increases in foreign revenue. The ECB’s results indicate that subsidy increases are followed by higher domestic and foreign revenues at Chinese firms, with the strongest effect appearing within the first two to three years.

The pattern is even clearer in strategic sectors. In automobiles, photovoltaics, wind turbines, and semiconductors, the contribution of subsidies to export growth is estimated to be four to fourteen times larger than the corresponding effect for the overall sample of Chinese firms examined.

The ECB notes that the results should be interpreted with caution and do not by themselves prove that subsidies cause the rise in exports. They do show, however, that state industrial policy can substantially alter trade balances in strategic sectors.

The Risk of European Deindustrialization

China now combines lower costs, strong state financing, growing technological capability, and higher product quality, while becoming less dependent on imports from Europe and the rest of the world. At the same time, weak domestic consumption and slower investment growth make Chinese growth more reliant on external demand. A larger share of production is therefore directed to international markets, increasing pressure on European firms both inside the EU and in third countries.

The ECB warns that if subsidies produce exports larger than underlying economic conditions would justify, the adjustment costs for trading partners can be significant, including job losses and deindustrialization. Fitch judges that the factors driving Chinese competitiveness are unlikely to reverse soon. European governments therefore appear increasingly willing to use trade measures to protect the continent’s industrial base, though this does not mean existing trade trends can be quickly reversed.

Greece, as a eurozone member with limited heavy industry but ambitious renewable-energy targets and a strategic location, faces a particularly sharp version of this challenge. Chinese solar panels, batteries, and AI-related hardware arriving at low, subsidized prices can speed up Greece’s energy transition and reduce costs, yet they also risk crowding out any emerging domestic capabilities in these fields and deepening dependence on Beijing.

The country’s role as a major entry point for Chinese goods into Europe—especially through the COSCO-operated Port of Piraeus—further magnifies its exposure to these competitive pressures.

READ MORE: The Eastern Mediterranean Arc: India raises its stake in Greece.

Paul Antonopoulos

Paul Antonopoulos writes on Greek and international current affairs for Greek City Times, with a focus on Turkey, Cyprus, and the wider region.



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