
Eastern Libyan military commander Khalifa Haftar gestures as he speaks during Independence Day celebrations in Benghazi on December 24, 2020. [Reuters]
Negotiations – and, more broadly, the trajectory of relations – with a state exhibiting the characteristics of present-day Libya do not allow for premature enthusiasm or disappointment. In Tripoli’s invitation to international companies to participate in its energy program (coinciding with a presentation in the United States showcasing the prospects for hydrocarbon exploitation), the median line was scrupulously respected, in line with the Greek interpretation.
Even in the recent agreement for seismic surveys by the Turkish national oil company (TPAO), the four designated offshore blocks lie within the median line. These developments sparked cautious optimism about a potential shift in the stance of Greece’s eastern neighbor – an expectation that was emphatically disproved. Once again, disappointment and concern now dominate regarding Libya’s intentions.
Libya, as a failed state whose government struggles to maintain control – especially amid ongoing clashes between militias and paramilitary forces near Tripoli – clearly does not make decisions or undertake initiatives in the manner of a functioning state with stable institutions and governance.
After all, the 2019 Turkey-Libya memorandum was signed at the direction of the Turkish Ministry of National Defense, while the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was kept entirely uninformed.
Similarly, Libya’s recent note verbale to the United Nations should not be viewed as a product of Libyan policy alone, but rather as an extension of Turkish influence. This explains the contradictory and self-negating stance: On one hand, Tripoli respects the median line in the context of its international tender – aimed at attracting energy companies and projecting a sense of responsibility – while on the other, it irresponsibly endorses the baseless Turkey-Libya memorandum in its official protest against Greece.
Two expected yet still troubling issues arise. First, in the maps attached to Tripoli’s note verbale depicting the proposed delimitation line, Libya extends the boundary from the point where Turkey intends to delineate with Egypt, thereby asserting claims against Greece that exceed the area defined by the existing exclusive economic zone (EEZ) agreement with Turkey.
Secondly, whereas in negotiations up until 2010 the primary disagreement between Athens and Tripoli centered on the effect of Gavdos island – while also taking into account the coastline of Crete – Libya now proposes that the delimitation of maritime zones be conducted solely between the Libyan coast and the southernmost point of the Peloponnese mainland, completely disregarding the existence of Crete.
This position reflects an uncritical adoption of Turkey’s stance that islands are entitled to no more than 6 nautical miles of territorial waters. The most significant obstacle lies in the fact that, while Libya would receive approximately 63,000 square kilometers in the event of a bilateral agreement with Greece, Turkey – by appropriating Greece’s sovereign rights – is offering Libya an additional 39,000 square kilometers.
Even if the situation in Libya were to normalize, what Libyan leader would dare to overturn a scandalously favorable – albeit illegal – agreement in favor of a legal but disadvantageous one, as the Greek-Libyan agreement is often perceived? Under the current circumstances, the most expedient solution would be to persuade Egypt to appeal to an international judicial body – an action Libya would likely follow – with the aim of determining a small but strategically significant area claimed by Egypt and included in the Turkey-Libya memorandum.
In any case, the hard lesson for Greek diplomacy is this: Had we reached an agreement with either Libya or Egypt – or both – prior to 2019, the delimitation of an EEZ between Turkey and Libya could have been prevented.
Constantinos Filis is an associate professor at the American College of Greece and director of its Institute of Global Affairs.