Measures against other people’s corruption


Is there a way to prevent such monstrous forms of political and economic corruption in the future as Greece’s EU farm subsidy fraud? Can we get rid of the clientelistic system that is costing us so dearly? Is it possible to change decades-old or even centuries-old mentalities and ways? The answer is no, and the reason is simple: while we will win collectively if we succeed, each of us has an incentive to act opportunistically, to demand a fight against corruption but only when it relates to other people. What’s more, such problems are hard and slow to change. No corrupt political system has been transformed into a virtuous one overnight. In fact, I doubt whether there has ever been a relatively virtuous political system in human history.

So, should we accept that nothing will change? Of course not. We can do several things to improve the situation somewhat. A large number of Greek intellectuals have dealt with the issue from time to time and have submitted proposals. Some were unfounded, some were realistic, some were ideological and naive, others were realistic and well-crafted. We do not lack proposals, nor even attempts at reform. What we lack is their consistent implementation.

I will add some ideas of my own, with little hope that they will be adopted for the reasons that great political philosophers, such as Thomas Hobbes and Immanuel Kant, have pointed out to us. People have a tendency to exclude themselves from the rules and obligations that bind others. Of course, we have had several major reforms in our history that seem to be exceptions to this rule, such as the establishment of the independent authority responsible for recruiting public sector employees (ASEP). But even this example demonstrates how quickly efforts to undermine its work by the corrupt clientelist state begin.

The EU subsidy scandal exposed the abuse of public money as a tool for buying votes and securing party loyalty. To manage this problem, we must treat politicians not as idealistic public servants, but as individuals driven by the same motivation that drives most people: personal interest. You might ask, who today has an idealized image of politicians? Apparently no one, but in reality many more people than we think. They are naive party followers, those who believe in the “moral advantage” of their like-minded people, etc. All of them are potential victims. However, politicians worldwide are almost always involved in (or even hostages of) vested interests. We cannot rely on the moral integrity of those who exercise power. On the contrary, we must design appropriate institutions, or rulebooks, that will limit opportunities for selfish behavior.

The following are some suggestions based on institutional theory, but also on the experience of their implementation in many different countries. To understand the logic of these suggestions, you should take into account that institutional theory sees rules as an incentive structure that can influence the behavior of individuals in the desired direction.

A frequently proposed institutional solution is to impose term limits on elected officials. That is, a politician cannot be re-elected for more than a certain number of terms (e.g. two). The rationale is that this prevents the creation of professional politicians who cling to power for decades, building clientelistic networks and political dynasties. Another obvious solution is to abolish the open party list ballot and transition to a closed party list, where MPs are elected in a predetermined order based on the party’s choices, as long as the party operates in a rudimentary democratic manner. In such a system, the pressure for bribery is reduced. A crucial question is whether Greece would benefit from small single-member districts or, conversely, from a single nationwide district (or, possibly, a mixed system). Each option has advantages and disadvantages, but it is better than the current complex and distorted electoral system that breeds corruption.

No single change will magically eliminate corruption. What we need is a comprehensive approach to institutional redesign, taking into account the interactions between rules. No institutional change will succeed unless it is accompanied by a change in mindset and systematic enforcement of the rules. Laws must be applied consistently; impunity is corruption’s greatest ally.


Aristides Hatzis is a professor of philosophy of law and theory of institutions at the University of Athens.





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