
German Chancellor Angela Merkel (left) talks to Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras at the Chancellery in Berlin on March 23, 2015. [Guido Bergmann/ Bundesregierung/Handout via Reuters]
Looking back today at the events surrounding the Greek referendum in July 2015 from a German perspective, one is still struck by the level of animosity, oversimplification and polarization that characterized the political relationship between Berlin and Athens at the time. Fortunately, the repair efforts made over the past decade have yielded positive results. However, scars remain, as does some unfinished business.
The result of the referendum – 60 percent in favor of “ochi,” a Greek word many Germans quickly learned – was a considerable political setback for the then chancellor Angela Merkel. She had dominated the narrative of eurozone crisis management in Germany and was determined to do the same at the European level. However, German politics was slow to understand the underlying reasons for the referendum’s result. Berlin misread the magnitude of anger and protests that Greek citizens articulated, not only against IMF-led austerity measures, but also against Merkel and her government, in particular.
The German authorities may have been schooled in ancient Greek tragedies. But the real-time cascade of events unfolding in Greece since the beginning of 2015 when SYRIZA won the parliamentary elections and Alexis Tsipras became prime minister repeatedly caught decision makers in Berlin by surprise. This was most acutely illustrated by the very public disagreements in meetings between the then German finance minister, Wolfgang Schaeuble, and his Greek nemesis, Yanis Varoufakis. The former’s prime concern was to ring-fence developments in Athens and prevent them from turning into a eurozone drama. The latter’s objective was precisely the opposite – to escalate a major domestic problem into European turmoil.
The outcome of the July 2015 referendum in Greece, as well as the chaotic process by which Alexis Tsipras’ government then reached a last-minute agreement with international creditors on the third macroeconomic adjustment program, became a boon for populists in Germany. Depending on whom one talked to in Germany’s wave of anti-establishment protests during the second half of 2015, demands for “Grexit” – temporary or permanent – surged. Members of Chancellor Angela Merkel’s governing coalition called for Greece’s euro expulsion. The leading voice for “Grexit” was the nascent right-wing extremist party Alternative fur Deutschland (AfD), which 10 years later is the second-largest party in Germany’s federal parliament, the Bundestag.
Gradually, the denunciation of Greece in parts of the German media and politics gave way to re-evaluating the government in Athens as a necessary partner in the face of the rise of uncontrolled immigration that began reaching Germany in the fall of 2015. This reassessment led to a rhetorical de-escalation between policy makers in Berlin and Athens. Similarly, Greece underwent a tepid revision. While Schaeuble remained deeply unpopular in Greece, a reappraisal of Merkel began as she pressured her government to open German borders and allow the growing number of refugees into the country. But make no mistake about this supposedly “friendly” interpretation. Germany needed Greece to curtail the flow of incoming refugees, and preferably keep them on Greek islands instead of reaching their primary destination of choice.
How does German politics look at Greece today, 10 years after the 2015 referendum? Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis’ visit to Berlin in May 2025 represented a stark contrast to how Tsipras was received by and how he challenged the chancellor a decade earlier. The agenda of topics to discuss still includes migration issues and Greece’s reservations about German arms exports to Turkey. How to continue addressing Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine illustrates in what manner Mitsotakis and Germany’s new chancellor, Friedrich Merz, seek to solidify a common European defense and deterrence strategy vis-a-vis Russia.
But something else has changed in the bilateral relationship. Today, thankfully, the words “Greek crisis” and “Grexit” have disappeared in German narratives. Instead they have been replaced by considerations about what Germany can learn from Greece’s experience during the past 10 years. It is a public debate that is emerging in Berlin among policy makers and business representatives when arguing about the structural reform agenda that Germany should be implementing without delay. A decade earlier, policy makers in Berlin lectured their Greek counterparts on what needed to be done to avoid default. Today, German policy circles are holding Greece up as an example of what Berlin’s homework should look like.
Jens Bastian is a senior policy adviser for Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP). From 2022 to early 2025 he worked in Berlin at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP).