It took a few weeks to arrange this remote conversation with Daniel Ziblatt, professor of government at Harvard University and resident faculty associate of the Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies. Ziblatt, who co-authored the widely read and prophetic “How Democracies Die” (2018) with Steven Levitsky, director of the David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies at Harvard, was too busy documenting the United States’ rapid slide into authoritarianism.
Then, the university where he teaches became the unofficial leader of the resistance to the nascent Trump regime—and “that has come at a cost,” he says at the beginning of the conversation.
Crossing the line
The two professors, along with Lucan Way, professor of political science at the University of Toronto, wrote an essay in early May in the New York Times attempting to define when a system of government transitions from democracy to authoritarianism. The columnists proposed proposed a simple metric, the cost of opposing the government. Based on that, they argued that the US has crossed the line into competitive authoritarianism. How porous is that line?
“It’s one of the things that we’ve learned by looking at the evolution of democracies around the world, that there can be authoritarian ambitions of a leader, they try to institute a new regime, people change their behavior in response to this. But it’s always reversible, and the real question is, ‘Will this regime really take root? [Will it] endure?” Ziblatt tells Kathimerini.
Is this what US President Donald Trump is trying to do? “I think so. I mean, maybe not intentionally, but the effect is that.” One aspect is the attempt to circumvent the normal legislative process, by issuing multiple executive orders (“the highest number of executive orders since the Franklin Roosevelt administration,” he says) with the fewer amount of actual legislation being signed through the normal legislative process in over 50 years.
This is despite the fact that Republicans have a majority in the House, the Senate, and the presidency, while the Supreme Court is dominated by Republican appointed judges.
A second dimension, he continues, is changing the rules around freedom of speech and freedom of association. “Right now, in the US, if you are not a US citizen the normal rights that we have expected around freedom of speech, seem to be altered…That’s a major change in the kind of regime.”
Has there ever been in the history of America a more wide ranging assault on democratic governance? “There is a long history of authoritarianism, and the US, we don’t even have to go back to the 19th century; in the 20th century, the so called Palmer raids of the 1920s where socialists’ and anarchists’ rights were violated, people were deported, the McCarthy era, one can think of just the existence of the Jim Crow in the South were voting rights, were dramatically repressed for African American voters. I mean, there’s a strong authoritarian tradition in the United States, running all the way up to Richard Nixon. Nixon’s effort to surveil all the Democratic Party leadership was also a clear kind of authoritarian movement. I think what’s different about this, is how wide-ranging it is…which includes some of the core mainstream establishment institutions in the United States,” Ziblatt says.
“I think what surprised me the most is the speed with which it was being done, although we ought not have been surprised by this because it was laid out in Project 2025,” he adds. “But the speed with which this is being done in a highly decentralized, massive, large state, like the United States, a federal system, has been pretty surprising…The efforts at altering the rules of the game are more rapid than what we saw in Hungary, let’s say, back in 2010.”
In the same New York Times essay, the writers state that American society’s response to this authoritarian offensive has been underwhelming, alarmingly so. But is there a sense that after the initial shock and some high profile cases of attempts to strike a deal – like Columbia University or the law firm Paul Weiss – the will to resist is growing?
“I think so. One of the things that is unusual about the US compared to other similar kinds of experiences in other parts of the world is that there’s certainly the organizational muscle in civil society to respond to this effect, the amount of resources that are held by corporations, by media companies, by institutions like universities, the prestige that they have, the autonomy that they have, means that this gives them the resources to respond effectively to this – if they choose to. What was striking over the first couple of months was, a degree to which people in a certain way, individuals were making this calculation that, well, if we stay out of the headlines, if we make individual deals, maybe we’ll be safe. it’s a kind of individual appeasement. It’s a classic, what social scientists call a collective action problem, or each individual leader of an organization thought, in order to look out for my organization, my firm, I should sort of act cautiously. But the net result has been that it was just very easy to push through and continue the work of assaulting basic institutions,” he explains.
The professor says the writers cite in the article a line from Winston Churchill, that appeasements is like feeding a crocodile, hoping to be the last one eaten. “You’re right that there are signs of kind of a counter-mobilization,”he says. “If individual citizens, ordinary citizens look and see that organizations, firms, universities, that have lots of resources at their disposal, don’t dare to push back, then it sends the signal, what hope do I have? As a single individual? And so the increasingly effective response of these organizations and civil society institutions sends a kind of galvanizing message that actually push back is possible and it kind of punctures that myth of overwhelming authoritarian power.”
But, looking back, what are the key factors that rendered the US vulnerable to it, after all? The professor cites the experience of the financial crisis, the experience of the Covid-19 pandemic, but notes an additional factor: “I think there’s an under-appreciated role played by memory politics. And by that I mean that unlike other democracies – say Greece, Spain, Portugal, or even further back Germany – had a recent experience with authoritarianism,” that the US has not had.
The US, which has had a stable constitutional order for over 200 years, has created a sense of complacency, he says. “There’s a kind of self conception of invincibility that I think leads to a certain reckless disregard for actually how fragile any democratic Constitutional order is.” The recent authoritarian experience of the Jim Crow era in the South, where voting rights of African Americans were repressed, did not become part of the collective memory because it affected only part of the population.
When the Watergate scandal broke out, it was Republican lawmakers that forced Nixon’s resignation in 1974. Today’s Republican Party, by contrast, is unwilling to restrain Trump on almost any front. How key is this to the emergence of this authoritarian moment in America?
“I think it’s absolutely central. You know, going back to the 19th century…the role of a center right party in constraining demagogues and limiting their access to power is really been central…through the selection process of selecting candidates for president,” Ziblatt explains. But in the 1970s, the system changed with the center of gravity shifting to the primaries.
“One of the advantages [of the old system] was that these party leaders knew the candidates, they knew who were demagogues, they knew who were drunks, they knew who all the kind of weaknesses and vulnerabilities, and they would choose who they thought was the best candidate…Over time, as you look at the people running for a nomination over this period, you had increasing numbers of kind of marginal people running for president, each with their own kind of billionaire backer.”
The conversation turns to far-right figures in the US, such as carmaker Henry Ford and aviator Charles Lindbergh, who in Philip Roth’s novel “The Plot Against America,” an alternative history of World War II, becomes president and signs a nonaggression pact with the Nazis. “The reality is Charles Lindberg never could have become the nominee, because the party leaders would have never let it happen. because they had the resources,” Ziblatt notes.
“The fundamental problem was the Republican Party thought that they could ride [Trump’s] popularity to power, and that ultimately they would constrain him. We’ve seen throughout history that may be sometimes works, but it’s a very risky proposition because it often backfires and very quickly the tables get turned and the demagogue uses the party rather than the other way around,” he adds.
The milestone of 2026
Looking ahead, how optimistic is Ziblatt that the US will hold free and fair elections in November of 26?
“I’m pretty optimistic. I think we will hold free and fair elections in November 2026. I don’t know what the results of those elections will be in they’ll be very pivotal,” he says, adding however that he is concerned about political violence and efforts to intimidate voting officials. “It’s not going to be an easy process, but it’s essential, because that’s the main avenue by which electoral authoritarianism is beaten – at the ballot box.”
How important is the outcome of this fight for democracy in the US for the rest of the world? “It’s very significant. An autocratic backsliding in a small country is certainly tragic for the citizens of that country, but the global reverberations of it are often quite small…In the case of the US, it is even more significant because it’s larger economy and more significant, geopolitical power.”
He presents NATO as an example. Will an autocratic regime in the US remain committed to the transatlantic NATO Alliance? “You know, what happens in our domestic politics has security consequences….the ability to travel to Europe, which Americans take for granted, this is the kind of thing that becomes vulnerable and becomes much more contentious and a kind of world in which democracy and alliances between the US and other countries’s fray.”
“We’ve seen this in trade – an unconstrained leader can do a lot of damage if on the world economic stage if they are in a big country. So I think economically, geopolitically, the consequences of democratic decay in the US were already beginning to see it, and if it gets worse, the consequences only even be greater.”