
Father Justin of Sinai, a librarian, turns the pages of a manuscript in the library of St Catherine’s Monastery in South Sinai, Egypt, on March 6, 2019. [Reuters]
Bilateral ties between Greece and Egypt are not at their strongest. Cairo’s reversal of the agreement reached last December between the Greek Orthodox Monastery of Saint Catherine in Sinai and the local authorities has raised concerns – especially given that this is not the first instance of Egyptian authorities appropriating third-party property.
Despite longstanding goodwill and frequent cooperation between the two countries, Egypt has, since 1979, made its intentions clear through a gradual “salami-slicing” approach aimed at incrementally seizing the monastery’s properties. This practice dates back to the 1920s and 1930s, when similar tactics were employed against Greek communities and the Patriarchate of Alexandria. These actions have not been targeted exclusively at Greek or Greek Orthodox interests, but more broadly at property owners deemed vulnerable. A telling example is the past attempt by Egyptian authorities to restructure the board of the Greek Nautical Club of Alexandria, in a bid to wield influence over its decisions due to the club’s ownership of prime real estate.
Athens’ expectations have shifted depending on the regime in power in Cairo, and the current government is considered the most friendly to date. This may explain – though not excuse – the misplaced confidence that it would act consistently with its stated commitments.
The recent visit by the Greek foreign minister underscored a desire to find ways to repair the damage caused by Egypt’s deliberate missteps. What is Greece’s goal under the current circumstances? To reach a high-level agreement that is sufficiently binding for Cairo – one that not only affirms the Greek Orthodox character and historical continuity of the properties in question but also ensures the preservation of the status quo. If Athens is recognized as a formal contracting party within Egypt’s regulatory framework, then Greece’s legal interest would, by implication, gain official acknowledgment.
An out-of-court settlement signed by an appointed governor would neither confer legal title nor safeguard the long-term interests of the monastery and its steadily declining monastic community. However, if the nature of the monastery’s operations were to change – currently limited, for instance, by restricted visiting hours due to its religious character – it could potentially be transformed into a tourist destination offering a broader range of services beyond the strictly spiritual. The estimated value of the monastery’s real estate in the area is between $400 million and $500 million – assets that, if commercialized, could offer a significant boost to the Egyptian economy.
Athens is fully aware of the growing domestic pressures facing President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi – pressures fueled by economic difficulties and a rapidly expanding population, both of which risk triggering social unrest. It is undeniable that Egypt has been more severely affected than many other nations by the war in Ukraine and the resulting disruption of grain imports. The situation has been further compounded by a steep 65% drop in Suez Canal revenues due to Houthi attacks in the Red Sea, along with a sharp decline in tourism.
Against this backdrop, when it comes to the monastery’s ownership status, the Egyptian president – and indeed the country’s authorities more broadly – appear to be acting in concert, even if this alignment is not explicitly communicated to the Greek side.
What is needed now is deft handling rather than panic or public outcry. While the outcome of this issue may not be decisive, it will nonetheless have a bearing on the trajectory of the deeply valued bilateral relationship.
Egypt remains a cornerstone of Greek foreign policy in the wider region. Beyond matters such as the delimitation of an exclusive economic zone and energy-related cooperation, Egypt has become a key counterweight to Turkish revisionism.
Migration is another pressing concern: increased flows from eastern Libya – primarily involving Egyptian nationals – make Cairo’s influence in Libya’s internal balance all the more relevant to Greece’s interests.
Moreover, Greece has taken a leading role in securing European financial support for Egypt, playing a central part in accelerating the disbursement of the initial €4 billion tranche. This gives Athens a measure of leverage. Ultimately, the negotiation must unfold on political terms and with due consideration for Greece’s legitimate concerns.
Constantinos Filis is an associate professor at the American College of Greece and director of its Institute of Global Affairs.