The European defense vacuum and Turkey


The European defense vacuum and Turkey

US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, left, and NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte deliver statements ahead of a meeting of NATO defense ministers at NATO headquarters in Brussels, on June 5, 2025. [Virginia Mayo/AP]

Donald Trump’s return to the White House and his often mutually exclusive moves on the global chessboard have brought about divergences, but they also create the need for convergences. Trust in American leadership is eroding exponentially, even as partners and competitors, with the exception of China, try to publicly and privately flatter a leader who seeks the constant boosting of his ego.

In a dystopian international environment, where the unilateralism of the United States, rather than isolationism – let alone multilateralism – dominates, other countries are obliged to take their own measures and strengthen their voice and influence through partnerships. Regardless of whether Washington ultimately withdraws partially or completely, diplomatically or militarily, from various regions of the planet, a psychological gap has emerged which the American president is not just unwilling to bridge, but rather consciously intends to maintain, if not expand, because he believes that in this way he will be in a more advantageous position, since everyone else will be on alert and, anxious about their place in the existing order of things, will be more vulnerable to American pressure.

Nevertheless, Trump seems undaunted and determined not to back down on issues that directly or indirectly concern European defense and security. The concept of collective defense has faded, not only because of statements that could even bring two NATO member-states, the United States and Denmark, into direct military confrontation over Greenland, but mainly because of the apparent reluctance of the US, on the one hand, to continue contributing equally to the NATO budget, and, on the other, to remain committed to defending every last inch of NATO territory.

Therefore, it is imperative to develop the European pillar within NATO in the first phase and then, depending on developments, to promote a complementary but potentially autonomous mechanism. This project, of course, requires a lot of time, huge funds (to some extent), and a change of culture. In fact, although at the moment the majority of European citizens reluctantly support the intention of their leaderships for Europe to develop its own path regarding defense issues, any loss of funds to the detriment of the welfare state may turn them in other directions in the future. Much will depend on the feeling of insecurity and vulnerability, as well as the prioritization of threats. If, for example, a substantial settlement were to emerge and not just a ceasefire in Ukraine, and the image of an aggressive and revisionist Russia gradually began to change (and a president with pro-European characteristics took the reins in the US in 2028), the European defense project, and especially its necessity, would likely be questioned from within.

At this stage, however, several European countries agree that it is the right time to start relying on their own strength. Some countries will remain in this “alliance of the willing.” Also, it is not mandatory for countries to allocate forces and resources with the same degree of commitment and in large numbers, while the development and independent skills of domestic defense industries – and by extension the scope for partnerships – are certainly not always proportional between states. In this light, for many European countries Turkey’s participation is considered pivotal, much more so given its synergies with European companies, its aggressive acquisitions and the certifications it has secured for possible co-productions. In the event of a reversal or hesitation on the part of some Europeans (in case of changing political relationships or social dynamics or even fatigue from the war fronts) who are not accustomed to being involved in armed conflicts, Turkey seems willing to cover part of the losses.

It is unnecessary to mention the reasons why Turkey cannot be part of European defense unless it complies with specific, self-evident conditions, despite its recently upgraded position on security issues. This gives Greece the opportunity to promote its own conditionality, with the request for the lifting of the casus belli being (simply) a good start, in the form of a reminder to our European partners.


Constantinos Filis is an associate professor at the American College of Greece and director of its Institute of Global Affairs.





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