In a speech in Saudi Arabia earlier this month, Donald Trump laid out a radical new approach to US foreign policy. No longer would America concern itself with promoting values such as democracy and liberty. What matters now is deals, regardless of political differences. Last week, we saw this new “Trump doctrine” in action. After two and a half hours on the phone to Vladimir Putin, Trump emerged to say that even though the Russian president had refused to agree to a ceasefire, he would not be hitting Russia with fresh sanctions as this might interfere with future business. Instead, he effectively washed his hands of the peace talks.
Europe should have prepared for this moment long ago. Instead, it finds itself in a hopeless position. Its leaders warn that a Russian victory in Ukraine would pose even graver security risks for the continent, as is clear from the latest evidence of a Russian military buildup on the Finnish border. Yet Europeans cannot provide credible security guarantees to Kyiv in the absence of dwindling American support. Nor is it only on Europe’s eastern border that the continent is vulnerable to the new Trump doctrine; no ally can feel safe in a world where US support may be conditional on who offers the greatest commercial opportunity.
Clearly Europe needs to rearm – and rearm fast – if it is to continue to defend its own values and have any chance of being a pole in an emerging multipolar world. Even as some European countries struggle to hit NATO’s target for defense spending of 2 percent of GDP, it is clear that the target is too low and may be raised at the Alliance summit in June to 3 percent. Meanwhile, if Europeans are to reduce their dependence on America, they will need to invest in “strategic enablers” such as satellite systems, intelligence, and heavy transport capabilities.
To rise to this challenge, Europe is going to have to do what it has so often done in response to shocks and crises: improvise new institutions and instruments. The scale of investment in defense needed is too much to be left solely to national governments. Germany may have the fiscal capacity to borrow up €1 trillion to spend on defense but most countries are in no position to take on extra debt. The new €150 billion EU SAFE mechanism agreed last week will lower borrowing costs for some member-states but is unlikely to lead to significant new spending. Besides, individual countries on their own are hardly likely to invest in a new satellite network or the next generation of fighter jets. These need to be procured and funded collectively.
Yet the EU itself is hardly the right institution to lead this rearmament effort. For a start, it contains several countries that are constitutionally neutral, which complicates their participation in common defence programs. Then there are those such as Hungary whose Putin-friendly leadership cannot be counted on to support efforts to bolster European security to counter the Russian threat. Crucially, the EU does not include some countries that will have a vital role to play in maintaining European security, not least Britain but also Norway and Switzerland. That points to the need for a new inter-governmental initiative, outside the EU.
Meanwhile the biggest challenge for any common European rearmament effort is to ensure that the money is spent efficiently. That is almost impossible under current procurement practices, which are heavily tilted in favour of national champions. One reason that the EU has never been able to establish a single market in defense equipment is that Article 346 of the European Treaty carves out a national security exemption for the sector from single market rules. The result is that the industry is highly fragmented, which in turn leads to high costs, small order sizes and too many platforms. For example, Europeans operate 12 different main battle tanks, whereas the US has just one. Only common procurement on the basis of open tenders and nondiscrimination can drive the much-needed economies of scale.
Fortunately, there are two proposals circulating in EU policy circles that address some or all of these challenges. One plan, which originated in London, is to establish a European Rearmament Bank. This is modeled on the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), which was established in 1991 to help Central and Eastern European countries transition from a planned economy. It would provide cheap loans to governments and defense firms to reduce the costs of procurement. A more ambitious proposal advanced by economists at Bruegel, the Brussels-based think tank, is for a European Defense Mechanism. This is modeled on the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) created during the eurozone debt crisis. It would buy defense equipment directly on behalf of governments.
The beauty of both proposals is that they could be implemented swiftly. After all, the EBRD was up and running within five months of its conception, while the precursor to the ESM took just two months to become operational. Sure, some governments will be resistant to any plan that leads to more common European borrowing. Others may be reluctant to see their euros diverted from their national champions or to non-EU contractors. But the prize is a larger, more efficient European defense market and a safer, more sovereign continent.
Simon Nixon is an independent journalist and commentator on British, European and international political economy and geoeconomics