CAATSA sanctions not the real obstacle between Turkey and the F-35 program


Although US President Donald Trump appears committed to lifting CAATSA sanctions and reviving arms sales to Turkey – including its acquisition of F-35 fighter jets – his administration’s legal teams are dealing with a challenge that is significantly more complex than simply waiving the restrictions.

The White House generally has the authority to lift CAATSA (Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act) sanctions without Congress’ approval. But as opposed to other countries subject to CAATSA, the US-Turkey defense relationship is also subject to Section 1245 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for the Fiscal Year 2020, which was introduced in 2019 and is still in force. The provision explicitly prohibits the transfer or delivery of F-35 fighter jets to Turkey due to Ankara’s acquisition and possession of the Russian S-400 air defense system. This prohibition remains in effect unless there is a substantive change in the status of Turkey’s possession of that system.

Unlike CAATSA – which grants the president specific powers to suspend or lift sanctions under certain conditions – the NDAA provision does not allow for any such presidential override. Therefore, the sale of F-35s to Turkey – or its reintegration into the F-35 program – remains impossible from a legal standpoint unless something changes with regard to its possession of the S-400 system or Congress explicitly amends the current NDAA, repeals the relevant provision through new legislation, or enacts a new federal law that overrides the existing one.

That would be the correct legal procedure. Nevertheless, it is worth noting the US executive branch has, at times, exploited legal and procedural loopholes – or employed legal maneuvering – to circumvent or dilute congressional restrictions. Potential avenues could include broad or narrow interpretations of existing legislation, the exploitation of ambiguities or linguistic flaws in relevant provisions, or the reframing of factual circumstances to support the argument that the original conditions which triggered the ban no longer apply.

According to legal sources in Washington with direct knowledge of the matter, in a hypothetical scenario whereby the Russian S-400 system was moved into storage – either inside Turkey, such as at the Incirlik Air Base, or outside the country – or if the system were effectively “disabled” or placed under the control of a third party, such as the United States, the US administration could argue that the key criterion of “possession” which originally triggered the FY2020 NDAA ban no longer applies. As such, continued enforcement of the relevant provision would no longer be legally justified. 

Kathimerini, in the meantime, has learned that the administration’s legal teams have been working on hypothetical scenarios of how it could be determined that Turkey is no longer in “possession” of the S-400 without actually removing the system from Turkey.

Back in 2019, the specific provision was introduced by senators James Lankford, Jeanne Shaheen, Thom Tillis and Chris Van Hollen. It explicitly states that no funds authorized or appropriated to the US Department of Defense may be used for any of the following three purposes: the transfer, facilitation or authorization of the transfer of any F-35 aircraft or related support equipment to Turkey; the transfer of intellectual property, technical data or material support necessary for, or related to, any maintenance or logistical support of the F-35 aircraft that could contribute to the establishment of an indigenous Turkish F-35 capability; and the construction of, or assistance in the construction of, storage facilities for F-35 aircraft in Turkey or any facilitation of their storage on Turkish territory.

The only exception that is explicitly provided for is activated exclusively in the case of a joint written certification by the secretaries of defense and state to the relevant congressional committees. This certification must be accompanied by supporting documentation confirming that Turkey no longer possesses the S-400 system, that the Turkish government has provided adequate and reliable assurances that it does not intend to reacquire or reactivate the system and that, since July 31, 2019, it has not procured any additional Russian military equipment.





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