The chemistry between Kyriakos Mitsotakis and his host, Friedrich Merz, was good. The Greek prime minister was the first head of state to visit Berlin after Merz’s new government took office. The chancellor hailed the reforms passed by the Greek government – and the introduction of a six-day workweek, which Mitsotakis had to refute. And that’s about it for good news from the meeting in the German capital last week. The bad news is that existing problems look set to get worse: Germany’s pro-Turkish stance and its desire that Turkey should be a part of Europe’s new defense architecture; migration, and especially how it is managed and how this is communicated; and pressure from Berlin for a piece of Greek defense procurement programs.
‘Buy from us too’
According to Ronald Meinardus from the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP), “the most important political message to come out of the meeting was that defense procurement policy is back at the center of Greek-German relations.” It was actually the first issue Merz brought up, indicating the new German government’s priorities.
“The German arms industry’s intense dissatisfaction over its lack of involvement in the Greek government’s massive procurement programs is a given. Although not explicitly mentioned, it is well known that this also concerns the IRIS-T missile defense system, which is a perfect fit for the planned ‘Achilles’ Shield’ defense architecture, but so far has only been deployed by the Israelis,” adds Meinardus.
‘The most important political message to come out of the meeting was that defense procurement policy is back at the center of Greek-German relations’
The demand for buying German is not new; it has been a persistent thorn in bilateral relations. “It’s unacceptable,” German sources with knowledge of what was discussed at the Berlin meeting tell Kathimerini, insisting that no specific agreement was reached. It has been written that some bargaining did take place, but it seems that while the Greek prime minister appeared willing to focus on European arms and systems, he explained that the Americans are faster and more responsive.
For Jens Bastian from the Center of Applied Turkey Studies at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), the talks’ focus on armaments and immigration should come as no surprise. “That’s what Merz is like; he’s blunt about such matters. He didn’t say anything on these issues he hadn’t already said a few weeks ago. Merz is a tough negotiator and Mitsotakis knows this from previous meetings.”
On the issue of immigration, Greek Migration and Asylum Minister Makis Voridis and Germany’s Federal Minister of the Interior Alexander Dobrindt will have to sit down together and plot the next moves. They are both hardliners on migration and should be able to come to mutually acceptable solutions, though there is one element that is of intense concern to both sides and may cause some friction. The German chancellor and his interior minister are interested in showing more returns and fewer asylum applications in order to demonstrate that they are going through with their campaign pledges. The pressure from the xenophobic Alternative for Germany (AfD) party is immense, with some polls showing it inching dangerously close to the governing conservatives. The Greek side, on the other hand, wants no publicity about returns from Germany to Greece or about any discussions to this end. Even if it does consent to some returns, it does not want them made public because it, too, is afraid of how the Greek far-right would exploit such a development.
Returns and leaks
Meinardus believes that migration is an issue with broad public resonance. As expected, therefore, the German chancellor made a point of saying that secondary migration needs to decrease and returns to Greece need to increase. It is an issue that is much more explosive for Merz than it is for Mitsotakis on the domestic front. Merz needs to show tangible results if he wants to stem leaks from his party to the AfD.
“However, I do not expect Berlin to initiate mass returns. Athens would never agree to that. But new rules do apply from now on: It will no longer be possible for refugees who have been recognized in Greece to board a plane to Germany. This is a small step, but it will have an impact on numbers in the medium term,” says the ELIAMEP analyst.
“The Merz government will certainly adopt a tougher rhetoric on migration, both with regard to Europe’s external borders and to German borders. This is one of the biggest differences with Olaf Scholz’s government,” says Gunter Seufert, who ran the Center for Applied Turkey Studies at the SWP until 2003 and has written numerous books on Turkey.
He believes that Germany’s relationship with Greece is shaped by that with Turkey. For Berlin, ties with Ankara take priority, while the relationship with Athens is contingent on the state of the former. “There may be issues in bilateral ties – especially concerning secondary migration flows – but the challenges Germany faces with Turkey are far greater in scale,” he says.
New era
Having experienced how toxic bilateral relations between Greece and Germany can become during the economic crisis, Bastian is optimistic about the new era and was impressed by the fact that the meeting with the Greek prime minister took place just a week after Merz became chancellor.
“Mitsotakis was the first foreign prime minister to meet him in Berlin – and this alone is very symbolic. The Greek prime minister can go to the German capital and tell Merz, ‘Look at what’s been done in Greece in the past few years.’ The reforms carried out in Greece are a positive example of what needs to be done in Germany. Mitsotakis can visit Germany with confidence and speak with Merz on equal terms.”
How much Turkey does Merz want?
The German government is very much in favor of European defense cooperation with third countries – and this includes Turkey. Greece, for its part, wants as little Turkish involvement as possible, circles with knowledge of Greek-German contacts tell Kathimerini. It is a point on which there could be a certain convergence, given that it is not a bilateral issue but one that will be decided at the European level. In any case, the European Union is divided into two camps on this matter: those who believe Ankara is essential to European security and those who say, “Be careful who you include in your defense.”
On the other hand, Merz’s reference to Greece as the guardian of Europe’s borders is considered important, and it could also help the Greek side outline its terms for any Turkish participation in the EU’s new defense architecture. That said, concerns about human rights and the rule of law are unlikely to sway the present government in Berlin toward keeping Turkey at arm’s length, as they did the government of Olaf Scholz. The new chancellor is much more cynical than his predecessor, Germans in the know have told Kathimerini.
Gunter Seufert agrees: “The parties that are more ‘hostile’ toward Turkey – the Greens (because of Turkey’s rule of law violations) and the Liberals (as a matter of principle but especially because they are opposed to the possibility of Turkey joining the EU) are no longer in government. The two present coalition partners, the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats, work closely with the two biggest parties in Turkey. In the press conference [following the meeting with Mitsotakis] Merz did not refer directly to Turkey with regard to the new European defense architecture, but when referring to the ‘third countries’ that will participate, he also did not indicate that there would be certain terms and conditions. He did not, for example, say that ‘we will only cooperate with democracies or with countries that respect the rule of law.’ I also believe that he will consent to the delivery of the Eurofighter [aircraft]. There are, however, officials inside the Christian Democrats who are demanding that any such deal be attached to specific terms, such as that [the jets] will not be used against Greece – even though we know that such promises will not necessarily be upheld by Turkey.”
In Seufert’s opinion, Turkey’s and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s elevated geopolitical role do not just stem from the fact that Turkey hosted Russia-Ukraine and US-Iran peace talks, “but because [Turkey] managed to adopt a policy of equal distances toward Moscow and Kyiv. It did not take a clear side, it did not apply NATO sanctions, and it protected its own interests.”
Meinardus reminds us that “Merz has already revealed appreciation for Turkey during his visit to NATO last week, where he said that the country’s strategic importance cannot be underestimated. He will do everything he can to further develop this cooperation with Turkey. He did not reiterate this position at the press conference with Mitsotakis, of course. We never heard anything like that from the Scholz government, and especially not in that form, particularly since it lacked any criticism of Erdogan’s authoritarian style of governance. In this respect, the absence of the Greens from the government is expected to bring a new tone to the official rhetoric. As for the Eurofighters, Merz said in Brussels that his government will consider whether or not to approve their sale to Ankara. Based on Mitsotakis’ statements in Berlin, I can only conclude that the current behind-the-scenes focus will be on exploring the possible conditions under which such a sale to Turkey might occur, conditions that safeguard Greece’s national interests.”