
Chancellor Friedrich Merz sits on the government bench after taking the oath of office at the German federal parliament, the Bundestag, at the Reichstag building in Berlin, Germany, on May 6, 2025. [Markus Schreiber/AP]
For Friedrich Merz, the first day in the new job could not have gone worse. His failure to secure the necessary votes in the Bundestag to secure the chancellorship of Germany in the first round – the first time this has happened in the history of the post-war republic – was a humiliation. What makes it worse is that Merz has no idea who were the 18 members of his coalition who refused to back him in the secret ballot. The vote was a reminder that this most polarizing of political leaders, whose approval ratings are barely above 30 percent, has plenty of enemies even within the ranks of his wafer-thin parliamentary majority.
Those enemies include Social Democrats angry with him for siding with the AfD in a vote on immigration earlier this year, thereby breaking a long-standing taboo on working with the far-right. It also includes members of his own Christian Democratic party (CDU) furious that he broke his own manifesto commitment within days of the February election when he worked with the SPD and Greens to reform the country’s debt brake to allow a vast increase in government borrowing to pay for infrastructure and defense. It was striking that even on the second ballot when he secured the chancellorship, three members of his coalition still voted against him.
How much damage this fiasco inflicts on Merz’s authority is now a key question hanging over Germany and Europe. It is a mark of the hopes pinned on this new coalition government that the DAX 40 index of leading German shares tumbled by more than 3 percent in the hours between the two confirmation votes. Indeed, German and wider European stock markets have dramatically outperformed the US this year on expectations that German spending can help cushion the impact of Donald Trump’s tariffs and trade wars. Many economists now expect the European economy to grow faster than America next year for the first time in decades.
Yet Merz’s reform of the debt brake will not on its own revive a moribund German economy that has been in recession for the last two years. What matters is how and when and where all the extra money that Germany is borrowing is spent. Some have likened the giant expansion of borrowing to a “moonshot” – a once-only chance to transform the country’s growth potential. But the narrowness of Merz’s majority, combined with divisions within the coalition, raises the risk that this opportunity will be wasted. In particular, there are three tests for the coalition.
The first is whether the new government can deliver structural reforms to ensure that all the new spending delivers lasting improvements to productivity. These are the sort of reforms that Germany demanded of Greece during the eurozone debt crisis but has failed to undertake itself for more than two decades. They include cuts to Germany’s sprawling bureaucracy, reforms of the pension and welfare systems to provide greater incentives to work, and reforms to planning rules to speed up the construction of infrastructure. Merz has signaled his intent by appointing experienced business leaders to his cabinet. Nonetheless, the coalition agreement contained little detail on structural reforms, reflecting an ominous lack of political consensus.
The second test is whether Merz can deliver structural reform at the European level to improve the productivity of the single market. The challenges here were set out with brutal clarity in the reports last year by Enrico Letta and Mario Draghi. Indeed, Draghi has noted that for all the anxiety about Trump’s tariffs on exports to the EU, the EU’s own internal barriers to trade are the equivalent of a 45 percent tariff on goods and 110 percent on services.
Again, Merz has raised hopes of a more constructive approach after the disappointment of the Scholz government, which was hamstrung by internal divisions. He has given his backing to the proposed Savings and Investment Union, which is vital to improve access for growing European companies to finance. But will he take on domestic vested interests? The fact that he opposes completion of the banking union and the proposed takeover of Commerzbank by Italy’s Unicredit, suggests his pro-European tendencies have their limits.
The third test is whether Merz will agree to common European borrowing to help pay for increased defense spending. He has been vocal on the need for Europe to rearm to confront the threat from Russia and backed changes to EU fiscal rules to allow member-states to increase borrowing for defense. But many countries are in no position to take advantage of the rule changes. Nor will national defense spending overcome the deep fragmentation in the European defense equipment market, which reflects small order sizes and home biases in procurement.
The solution must be to coordinate some procurement at the European level via a dedicated fund. But having already angered many in his party by relaxing the debt brake, would Merz be willing to risk their wrath again by agreeing to more common European debt?
The stakes could hardly be higher. Should Merz flunk these tests, Europe will be left economically and defensively vulnerable. Meanwhile, waiting in the wings is the AfD and far-left, raising the specter of even deeper political chaos. Let’s hope the chancellor’s bad first day was just that – and not a sign of more trouble to come.
Simon Nixon is an independent commentator and the publisher of the Wealth of Nations newsletter on Substack.