Friedrich Merz: A German chancellor amid a perfect storm


Friedrich Merz: A German chancellor amid a perfect storm

Left to right: State Premier of Bavaria Markus Soeder, Chairman of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) party Friedrich Merz, Social Democratic Party (SPD) co-chairman Lars Klingbeil and SPD co-leader Saskia Esken attend a press conference to present the joint coalition agreement in the German Bundestag, in Berlin, Germany, on April 9, 2025. [Christoph Soeder/EPA]

Friedrich Merz is likely to be sworn in as the 10th chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany on May 6. He will replace Olaf Scholz (SPD), whose “traffic light” coalition (red, yellow, green) collapsed last fall due to internal tension primarily caused by the liberal party (FDP).

Merz’s political biography has not followed a linear path. Under Helmut Kohl, he quickly emerged as one of the new stars of the CDU. During the red-green government of Gerhard Schroder (1998-2005), he served as the young leader of the CDU parliamentary group, where he built a reputation as a brilliant opposition speaker. Against his will, he was ousted from this position by Angela Merkel in her quest to win the 2005 election. Many still argue today that this constituted a trauma for Merz; indeed, he relinquished his Bundestag seat, exited politics altogether, and turned to the corporate sector. He worked as a lawyer and held positions on several supervisory boards, notably at BlackRock Asset Management in Germany from 2016 to 2020.

His unexpected comeback was the consequence of prolonged political turmoil regarding the leadership and direction of the party in the post-Merkel era, in particular the defeat of the CDU in the 2021 election. He succeeded in consolidating intra-party tensions while moving the party more to the right, paying tribute to a sentiment that the party had become too center-left under Merkel. Furthermore, the ever-growing pressure from the extreme-right AfD led many in the party to believe that toughening the stance on migration would help neutralize AfD advances in polls and elections. Tragically, this didn’t help to halt the rise of AfD, which is now at almost 21 percent. 

For the election campaign, Merz’s CDU made migration the dominant issue, even though German voters expressed other priorities, such as peace in Europe and the economy. Another significant campaign topic was finding fiscal space to address urgent needs: a notoriously deteriorating infrastructure, particularly Germany’s hopelessly underfunded and neglected Bundeswehr, will require massive funding and investment. While the SPD and the Greens, as well as many regional CDU leaders, advocated for a much-needed reform of the traditional German debt brake, Merz and his allies appeared on panels and talk shows, condemning any relaxation of Germany’s debt brake as an irresponsible burden on the younger generation.

Even for seasoned observers, seeing Merz perform a very un-German “kolotoumba” was spectacular. Not long after election day, he approached his new SPD partners to negotiate a lift of the debt brake for defense spending and the simultaneous creation of an extra-budgetary vehicle of 500 billion euros to overhaul Germany’s deteriorating infrastructure. This required a two-thirds constitutional majority, and he needed the votes of the Green Party. In the ensuing negotiations, Merz painfully realized how counterproductive his confrontational campaigning against the Greens had been, as he had primarily blamed them for everything that had gone wrong in Germany. Ironically, the idea of a special fund for rehabilitating Germany’s fractured infrastructure had been a pet project of the Greens in the outgoing government, which had faced a veto from the smallest party, the FDP. With Merz suddenly needing support from the Greens, they achieved more of their agenda than in three years in government with the SPD and FDP.

Merz’s move to enable constitutional changes for defense and infrastructure has been bold and rational. Recent polling shows that it is also widely supported by the electorate. He now has significant fiscal leverage to address important domestic and external challenges even before he takes office. His credibility, however, suffered big-time. Many party members and conservative voters haven’t forgiven the reversal of one of his core promises during the campaign. There’s a lot of grumbling in the party base. His popularity is the lowest of any chancellor-designate in modern Germany’s history. 

Observers agree that the success of a Merz government will depend on finding solutions for pressing issues such as fractious infrastructure, illegal immigration, and a decline in the competitiveness of a country that likes to see itself as an economic giant. There is talk about a “last chance” for the parties of the political center, with a real danger of the extreme-right AfD winning a majority in the 2029 elections. 

European defense and security

But Friedrich Merz and his government equally face extraordinary external challenges, in particular the new and open confrontation with the US and the future of Ukraine. Amid the current turmoil, the coalition agreement reads however like an enumeration of politically correct statements, including a strong commitment to NATO and transatlantic partnership. Merz and his partners have opted for a cautious approach, which may in fact be the best choice at this time. However, in statements just after the election, Merz made some bold but risky remarks, saying that he saw the US disengaging and that it was his priority to help Europe develop its independent security and defense policy. 

Merz has vowed to heal the rifts between France and Germany, which had become apparent under Scholz, who never warmed up to his French counterpart and his vision of EU strategic sovereignty. Merz is open to Emmanuel Macron’s offer to consult on French-led nuclear deterrence, as a complement to the US nuclear umbrella (or as its substitute?). This may be surprising for a politician who has been a resolute Atlanticist and former chairman of Atlantik-Brucke, the most prestigious US-German transatlantic think tank and policy network. It’s a difficult balancing act: Making Europe more resilient and autonomous must be achieved without creating the impression that it is Europe pulling the plug from NATO. His courtesy visit to the White House will be interesting to watch. Donald Trump never hides his deep resentment toward Germany. 

For Ukraine, the likely new chancellor has always been a solid supporter. Contrary to Scholz, he advocated the delivery of German missile systems (Taurus) able to hit supply lines on Russian territory. The coalition agreement expresses a resolve to strengthen military, civil and political support to Ukraine to make Ukraine strong enough and at a level with Russia to negotiate peace. The debt brake reform offers increased funding for Ukraine’s defense. Nothing however is said about possible German participation in a security guarantee scheme. Still, it is hard to see how Germany could refrain from such an operation if others in Europe get engaged.

EU leadership

Friedrich Merz has repeatedly criticized his predecessor for a lack of leadership in the EU. He has pledged to improve Germany’s image as a trustworthy and leading power in the EU. Living up to this promise will depend on Merz’s ability to build good chemistry with his European Council peers and establish himself as a credible leader looking at German and EU interests alike. He wants to close ranks with France and Poland to revitalize the “Weimar Triangle” and open it to a “Weimar Plus” format, a flexible instrument for seeking consensus in the EU. But many will look at Germany’s migration policy. Merz’s campaigning for tough measures to halt the influx of illegal migrants to Germany has raised eyebrows. Proposals to push asylum seekers to other member-states have not gone down well in Austria, Poland and elsewhere. His SPD coalition partner has explicitly rejected these ideas as violating EU law. The coalition agreement now speaks of pushbacks “in consultation” with neighbors, but coalition partners cannot agree on what this will mean in practice. It remains to be seen whether the new chancellor can implement his far-reaching campaign promises given that he wants to strengthen solidarity in Europe for urgent action in other areas. He may know well that only a fundamental reform of the dysfunctional Dublin system will help, which would also have to address concerns of member-states with external EU borders, such as Greece.

On other fundamental EU issues the coalition agreement shows some flexibility. The expected commitment to budgetary discipline is accompanied by an opening clause that financing outside the EU budget should be an exception, which means that it is not ruled out. While we can expect the Merz government to continue pursuing budgetary orthodoxy, unconventional financing tools such as joint debt issuance are not excluded per se. Hence, there may be some space for finding common solutions in the divided views of member-states on the question of resource mobilization. 

On Turkey, the coalition agreement shows a silent sense of pragmatism. Behind the scenes, many in Berlin are aware of the danger of US disengagement from the southeastern flank of Europe and the potential threats that may arise. The new German government sees Turkey as an important strategic partner within NATO, a neighbor, and an influential player in the Middle East and for migration policy. There is only a tiny hint of the need to improve the human rights situation in Turkey. To many Germans, Turkey under Recep Tayyip Erdogan is erratic, but too important to be confrontational – at this point. 

In charge of foreign policy

The coalition agreement specifies that the Foreign Ministry will go to the CDU. This is a new and interesting move, as the party has not led the foreign office since 1966. Foreign policy had since then always been a turf for the smaller coalition partners, and an opportunity for them to seek a profile in statesmanship and diplomacy, as illustrated by Willy Brandt (from 1966 to 1969) or Hans-Dietrich Genscher (from 1974 to 1992). The fact that the chancellor and his foreign minister will now be of the same political color is likely to weaken the role of the Foreign Ministry. Merz has announced that he wants to be “in charge” of foreign policy. 

What we can see in the new coalition agreement is yet more proof that Germans see the need for reform but also cherish continuity. Some observers question whether the detailed coalition agreement is the big new departure that many want to see. Few in Berlin doubt that Friedrich Merz is passionate and emotional about core values and the need for change, particularly for Europe to gear up to complex global challenges. Although he has no direct executive experience, he is undoubtedly a seasoned politician with a profound knowledge of the economy and a thorough understanding of international affairs. His task is Herculean, and success will depend on silent and efficient statesmanship that can instil a new sense of solidarity and urgency in Europe. After all, much of Europe’s security and stability will hinge on a successful Germany. 


Peter Schoof is a former German ambassador to Greece. Since his retirement he has been working as senior advisor at Berlin Global Advisors, a geopolitical consultancy based in Berlin. He is also co-founder and director of Diplomatic Skills Lab, an association for the training and coaching of diplomats based in Brussels. The article reflects the personal views of the author.





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