Supporters shout slogans and hold posters depicting Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu during a protest near the Istanbul Police Department following Imamoglu’s arrest, in Istanbul, Turkey, on March 19, 2025. [Erdem Sahin/EPA]
In the wake of the detention on Wednesday of Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu on charges including corruption and aiding a terrorist group, Yavuz Baydar, columnist for Svenska Dagbladet’s Culture Edition and a blogger for the French independent news site Mediapart, explains to Kathimerini how Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is taking advantage of a favorable international conjuncture to cement his dominance in the country.
Baydar says banning Imamoglu from running in the next national elections will be the least bad outcome for the Istanbul mayor, if he manages to avoid imprisonment. With him out of the way, Erdogan’s only other rival is the nationalist mayor of Ankara, Mansur Yavas, who is a more “predictable” candidate. “For Erdogan, as Turkey’s strongman, the objective remains unchanged. That is, to establish, like Aliyev of Azerbaijan, Lukashenko of Belarus or Putin of Russia, the grounds for a lifetime presidency,” the journalist says
Was the crackdown expected or has it come as a surprise for the public?
It was, for some time, an “open secret” that the authorities have been busy preparing a comprehensive probe, and even Ekrem Imamoglu himself lately talked about a move targeting himself. Most recently, the financial police (MASAK) raided the offices related to the Greater Istanbul Municipality and branches, confiscating desktops. The strongest sign of the operation took place [on Tuesday], as the University of Istanbul annulled his diploma, citing alleged irregularities in his 1990 transfer from a private university in northern Cyprus to its faculty of business administration. Unlike in Greece, having a university degree is a prerequisite for candidacy in presidential elections under Turkish law. So, the crackdown was only a matter of when, rather than if.
Do Erdogan’s accusations against Imamoglu have any basis in reality?
There are two parallel cases, in which Imamoglu and about 100 people stand as suspects. One is a large graft probe, which alleges comprehensive fraudulent acts, such as illegally transferring bribes and under-the-table kickbacks obtained through tenders. Seen from the statement from the prosecution office, they seem detailed and rather tangible to analyze. Whereas the other file is based on alleged cooperation with what prosecutors call “cooperation with terror networks” such as KCK, a network branch of the PKK [a Kurdish militant political organization and armed guerrilla group], claiming employment of terrorists or sympathizers. This file is purely politically motivated, rather than a judicial one. But, overall, both amount to a move aimed at blocking Imamoglu from any further political move to challenge Erdogan in the next presidential elections. In all likelihood, the process has a clear path: It will successfully lead to, at best, a political ban, if not imprisonment. The subordination of the judiciary under the political executive in Turkey speaks strongly for such an outcome.
Could Imamoglu beat Erdogan in the next elections? Is that why Erdogan is pressuring him?
Clearly so. For Erdogan, as Turkey’s strongman, the objective remains unchanged. That is, to establish, like Aliyev of Azerbaijan, Lukashenko of Belarus or Putin of Russia, the grounds for a lifetime presidency. Like all of them, he sees great risks in leaving power, and is anxious of consequences. So, for Erdogan, it has been a pattern of either integrating potential rivals into his party, or imprisoning them. One such figure was the popular Kurdish politician Selahattin Demirtas, who has been in prison for over eight years, despite the ruling of the European Court. Next figure is Imamoglu who, along with the nationalist mayor of Ankara, Mansur Yavas, seems head-to-head with Erdogan, according to reliable surveys. But even then, whether or not “the system” – the autocratic structure based on unity of powers – in general would have allowed Imamoglu to claim victory through the ballot box is another open question.
What can Imamoglu do now?
It is certain, he will appeal the “diploma case,” but how the current probes of “organized crime” and “aiding and abetting terror” will develop remains to be seen: They can drag over time. Most likely, given the conjuncture, he will be held in pre-detention. One outcome is that he will be handed a ban on political activity for some years. The more immediate one is that, given the alleged linkage to “terrorist activity,” a government trustee will be appointed in his post as mayor, stripping him of his title. Some argue, optimistically, that he will emerge as a stronger candidate for the race, others have the opposite view. One source – an experienced politician in the center-right – told me this morning that Imamoglu’s greatest mistake was acting hastily. “He is only 53 years old,” the source said. “He has the time vis-a-vis an aging president, he could have focused on his current work, and waited for his turn.”
Could we now see another candidate from the opposition?
As it is clear, Erdogan will do his utmost to run against weaker, predictable candidates. The most likely figure is, as things develop now, Mansur Yavas, a low-profile politician in Ankara, with a background in the Gray Wolves, of the MHP. Other than him, there doesn’t seem to be any other name visible.
Will this move harm Erdogan politically and electorally or not necessarily?
There is a high dosage of wishful thinking amongst his critics about “self-harm,” as there is also a quasi-analysis about Erdogan tangled up in “fear.” These may be misleading to see the objective reality. Having established nearly full control over the state apparatus, judiciary and the media, Erdogan continues to be confident, especially counting on the international conjuncture as having turned even more in his favor. He had lost some percentages of job approval as of last year, but has regained them mainly thanks to his moves about Syria. Domestically he has managed to drive a wedge between the two major flanks of the opposition, the CHP and pro-Kurdish DEM Party, by offering a “carrot” to the latter, in a series of moves to improve conditions of the jailed PKK leader [Abdullah] Ocalan. In reality, his political attacks aim at keeping both parties weakened, and distanced from each other. Nowadays Kurds dream about “peace,” an ambivalent term under current conditions, as the secular Turkish segment is driven more and more into a defensive position. Erdogan’s strategy in “ruling by chaos” seems so far to be a successful one.