Petros Molyviatis addresses the 59th session of the United Nations General Assembly, on September 23, 2004. The former foreign minister has been actively involved in Greek-Turkish affairs since 1956, when he joined Greece’s Diplomatic Corps. [Richard Drew/AP]
The following conversation with Petros Molyviatis may have taken place 20 years ago, but it could just as well have been yesterday. This is not only because the agenda of Greek-Turkish relations has been shaped since the 1970s, with the fundamental differences that emerged back then remaining unbridged – and Turkey persistently adding new ones. It is also because the veteran diplomat, now aged 96, has always had a way of analyzing situations that stands the test of time.
The former foreign minister, who served under the conservative government of Kostas Karamanlis in 2004-2006 and in two caretaker cabinets during the Greek crisis, in 2012 and 2015, has been actively involved in Greek-Turkish affairs since 1956, when he joined the Diplomatic Corps.
Much of his career was spent alongside Konstantinos Karamanlis. In the following discussion, he revealed behind-the-scenes moments at key turning points in relations with Turkey, as well as the thoughts and wishes of Karamanlis every time he sat at the negotiating table.
When did you first have contact with the Turkish side as a young diplomat and what were the prevailing impressions with regard to Turkey at the time? Was Turkey regarded as a problem in the 1950s?
Turkey was, indeed, a constant problem in the 1950s, especially with the start of the Cypriot crisis. You may remember that EOKA [the National Organization of Cypriot Fighters] became active in April 1954 and that is when the whole Cyprus issue began. I joined the Foreign Ministry in 1956 under Minister [Evangelos] Averoff, with whom I immediately developed a warm working relationship and, I would say, a friendship as well. That’s when my contacts with the Turks also started.
What were your impressions of the situation at the time? Did Konstantinos Karamanlis trust the Turks, while the Cyprus crisis was evolving?
Look, even back in 1956, Mr Karamanlis believed in the need to normalize Greek-Turkish relations. It was his lifetime aspiration, not just a career goal, to achieve a normalization of Greek-Turkish relations. Perhaps he, like [Otto von] Bismarck, believed that geography is the only constant in history. So, with the realism that was so typical of his character, he believed that Greece and Turkey needed to have a good and harmonious relationship for the good of both countries and for the good of their overall interests. That is what he constantly strove for and he tried to accomplish it through dialogue. Karamanlis met with them all, from [Adnan] Menderes and [Suleyman] Demirel to [Bulent] Ecevit. And this accomplished nothing. Failing to succeed in normalizing Greek-Turkish relations was one of his greatest disappointments. The reason he did not succeed was that it takes two to make such a thing happen – and I’m afraid that Turkey did not reciprocate then just as it does not reciprocate now. And I believe that the reason why Turkey does not reciprocate is, unfortunately, because its single and unwavering goal is a revision of the status quo in the Aegean. This is something no Greek government could ever accept and this is why the normalization of Greek-Turkish relations has been impossible so far. I hope that the voice of reason will one day prevail, and it will become clear to Turkey that changing the status quo in the Aegean is not feasible. If they change their mindset and objectives regarding the Aegean, then I believe the normalization of Greek-Turkish relations will become possible.
We have also heard that the 1958-1960 period – his experience and the difficulty he had in “selling” this idea – left an indelible mark on Karamanlis. You witnessed all this first-hand. Was it, indeed, a very difficult period for the then prime minister?
‘Even back in 1956, Mr Karamanlis believed in the need to normalize Greek-Turkish relations. It was his lifetime aspiration, not just a career goal’
It was very difficult, yes, and the proof is the fact that Karamanlis is the only politician who ever solved the Cyprus issue. We can debate whether it was a good or a bad solution, but I believe that it was the only possible solution. No one, before or after Karamanlis, has been able to solve the Cyprus problem, which was and remains open. He was the only one who succeeded. He had the courage – the political courage that is – the resolve and the ability to address the Cyprus issue with the Zurich Agreement and with the agreement of Makarios, who was the elected representative of the Cypriot people. So, he achieved a solution to the Cyprus problem, which was a very difficult matter, of course with the cooperation of the late Averoff. Unfortunately, that agreement was overturned – and that was a mistake. If that agreement still existed, it would be paradise compared to the situation right now.
When Karamanlis returned to Greece after the fall of the junta in 1974, how concerned was he about a Greek-Turkish war? How likely was such a thing?
A Greek-Turkish war was imminent at that time; it was not an imaginary risk. There was a very real possibility of a Greek-Turkish conflict following Turkey’s successful operation in Cyprus and how it proved that Greece’s military readiness was non-existent. The military regime, which had failed in everything, had also failed to prepare the country militarily – it’s outrageous, unconscionable. If you remember, the mobilization that was attempted by the regime failed entirely. So, a Greece that was in a state of complete military vulnerability and, before Karamanlis’ arrival, complete diplomatic isolation, was an ideal target for Turkey. This is why I believe that war was imminent; it would have been easy for Turkey. And when I say war, I mean the occupation of several islands, which would have led to war. It was averted thanks to Karamanlis – thanks to his prudence, his steadfastness, his stature and his contacts with allies, friends and the easterners. A Greek-Turkish war was averted because Greece’s status and prestige were restored with Karamanlis’ arrival. This was proven shortly after with Greece’s induction into the European community.
The Greek government in 1975 proposed that all the differences between Greece and Turkey be referred to the International Court of Justice at The Hague. Do you remember how this proposal was worded and what the Turkish reaction was?
Karamanlis met with Demirel in May 1975 on the sidelines of a NATO assembly and this is where it was agreed, and documented in a communique signed by both leaders, that the two parties agreed to solve their differences in a peaceful manner. These differences, however, were not what they are today. The differences we’re talking about concerned the continental shelf and national airspace. There were no other differences on the table. So, the two prime ministers agreed on these two differences, to discuss them and solve them peacefully. On the matter of the continental shelf, it was agreed that if negotiations did not come to some resolution, the issue would be referred to the court at The Hague, which would delineate the continental shelf.
I have heard that there’s an interesting anecdote about that meeting and how the communique was achieved.
I’ll tell you if you like. When the talks broke for midday, I was in the cafeteria having lunch – a very light meal – with my Turkish counterpart and we were discussing how the communique should be worded. You know, communiques are drafted by the associates and then amended and approved by the leaders. So we were talking about the declaration and had more or less agreed, but did not have any paper on which to write it, so I wrote it out on a white napkin from the NATO cafeteria. My Turkish counterpart agreed to it, so we typed it up and presented it to the prime ministers, who approved it without making almost any changes.
If I remember correctly, Turkey backed out of that agreement, right?
Demirel backed out completely. Some 10 or 15 days after returning to Turkey, he reneged on the agreement to refer the delimitation of the continental shelf to The Hague, offering some excuses about not having read the communique carefully. It was quite ludicrous.