A Russian transport aircraft, carrying parts of the S-400 air defense systems, lands at Murted military airport in Ankara, July 12, 2019. Allowing Turkey to rejoin the F-35 program ‘would be a significant diplomatic achievement. It would also be good business for the F-35 program,’ says Andrew Novo. ‘To achieve that, however, either Washington or Ankara has to back down regarding the S-400 and that could be difficult,’ he adds.
There’s too much happening in the Eastern Mediterranean for the new US administration to ignore, says Andrew Novo, author and professor of strategic planning at the National Defense University in Washington. Meanwhile, he notes that military bases and infrastructure in Greece and Cyprus will remain vital to the strategic planning of the Trump administration because, as he explains, “due to their location, they can provide a cost-effective way to forward-position various assets in a sustainable, long-term way.”
How does the Eastern Mediterranean fit into the defense strategy of the new administration, especially given its shifting priorities toward the Indo-Pacific?
“Indo” might be the operative word here. The new administration has already made significant moves toward India. In the context of the Eastern Mediterranean, this means a renewed interest in, and support for, the India-Middle-East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC). This project was launched back in September 2023 as an alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative. It’s designed to connect India – through the Gulf States and transit points in Israel and Jordan – to Cyprus, Greece, Italy, and the rest of Europe. It has the potential to transform infrastructure and trade flows on a massive scale. Projects like the IMEC, America’s active role in the war between Hamas and Israel, and continued engagement over Russia’s invasion of Ukraine show that right now Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean remain a priority for American policymakers. There’s too much going on in the region for it to be ignored.
What risks could a potential future reduction in engagement pose for regional stability?
The United States is still the most effective coordinator of security in the Eastern Mediterranean because of its size and its relationships with the European Union, Turkey, Israel, and Egypt. Reduced engagement would create several vulnerabilities. It would open the region for China or Russia to expand their influence. If engagement is reduced abruptly, there could be a period of instability before European capabilities are built up. You could potentially see more violence between Iran and Saudi Arabia, or between their respective proxies. American disengagement would also raise the risk of further deterioration in the security situation for other points of friction: between Cyprus and Turkey, or between Turkey and Greece.
How can the Greece-Cyprus-Israel trilateral partnership become more strategically significant for the US?
I think the trilateral partnership, with the US as a +1, is really focused on the twin pillars of energy and security. The recent agreement among Cyprus, Egypt and ENI to process gas in Egypt’s existing Zohr facilities, then liquefy it in the Damietta LNG plant for export to European markets is a huge step in turning the region into an energy hub. This obviously raises the profile of Cyprus and of the region more broadly. The other pillar should be security. Greece and Cyprus offer stability in the region and a platform to project European and American power. Recent crises in the Middle East have shown how a presence in Cyprus can be used for support operations and humanitarian relief. Greece, largely through cooperation with the United States at the facilities in Alexandroupouli, has played an important role in supporting the shipment of supplies to Ukraine as Ukraine defends itself from Russia’s invasion. These are truly valuable contributions.
That has been the case until now. Moving forward, what role will military bases and facilities in Greece and Cyprus play in the broader defense planning of the new administration?
Those bases and facilities will play a major role in the United States attempting to build a security architecture for the region: to block China, to contain Iran, and to defend European and NATO interests against various threats. Because of their location, such bases and facilities can provide a cost-effective way to forward-position various assets in a sustainable, long-term way.
In this evolving strategic environment, how do you see Turkey’s role adapting?
Turkey’s role is definitely a dynamic one. They helped bring to power the new Syrian government and have a stake in how that turns out, including bases and a permanent military presence in the country. At the same time, they are continuing to work with Russia on building the nuclear power plan at Akkuyu and with China on the BRI. They have a more “free agent” attitude toward their role in the region and that will mean that Europe (including Cyprus and Greece), as well as the United States, will be negotiating and renegotiating with Turkey on every new issue that arises.
Do you think that Trump will eventually overlook Erdogan’s problematic behavior and move toward improving relations with Turkey, potentially lifting sanctions and allowing Turkey to rejoin the F-35 program?
That’s a hard prediction. On the one hand, bringing Turkey “back into the fold” and improving relations would be a significant diplomatic achievement. It would also be good business for the F-35 program. To achieve that, however, either Washington or Ankara has to back down regarding the S-400 and that could be difficult.
The views expressed are entirely Professor’s Novo and do not reflect the views of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or the United States Government.