Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan speaks at the Malaysia-Turkey Business Forum during his working visit to Malaysia, in Putrajaya, Malaysia, Tuesday. [Hasnoor Hussain/Reuters]
During the Crimean War, Great Britain and France formed an alliance with the Ottoman Empire against Russia and Greece. A similar shift in the European balance of power is now under way. As a small state in a dangerous neighborhood, Greece must read the room to avoid becoming sidelined within Europe by Turkey.
For more than a decade, Ankara pursued a complicated foreign policy of tactical entanglement in the context of its strategic competition with Russia. Yet the mask, and the gloves, are off now that Turkey helped the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham-led coalition overthrow Bashar al-Assad, the Russia- and Iran-backed butcher of Syria.
With America in the midst of a generational identity crisis, Europe, and therefore Greece, has few choices other than to forge closer ties with Ukraine and Turkey – by far the two most militarized states in the region.
Kyiv has a battle-hardened, million-man army and an innovative defense sector to complement it. It is clear, to anyone who has paid attention over the last three years, that Europe’s conventional defense against Russia depends more on Ukraine than it does on America.
Like Kyiv, Ankara has extensive experience dealing with Russia. In fact, from Syria to Azerbaijan to Libya, no world leader has outplayed the Russian war criminal Vladimir Putin as successfully as Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. By my count, Turkey’s strongman is undefeated against the Russian dictator.
Ankara is also integral for strengthening the industrial base of Europe’s defense. While Turkey’s economy is struggling, Europe is rich. The devalued Turkish lira provides better value, through lower wages and reduced production costs, for European companies. Turkey has a big labor force and a strong manufacturing base in both defense as well as adjacent industries like machinery too.
Short of an earth-shattering event, like war against Greece or Cyprus, there is little that will stop Turkey from filling the void Washington is leaving in Europe. Though Athens is unable to prevent this from happening, it can, and should, attempt to influence both the shape and the depth that Turkey’s closer alignment with Europe takes.
Put simply, there are three ways for Athens to deal with this development.
First, it can normalize relations with the Russian war criminal Vladimir Putin. Though Greeks on the far-left and the ultra-nationalist right are likely to welcome such a policy, this would essentially turn Athens into another Russian Trojan horse in Europe, like Hungary or Slovakia.
In theory, Greece could then position itself to extract as many concessions as it wants from its peers by sabotaging Europe, Turkey, and Ukraine.
In practice, however, Greece is likely to isolate itself, resulting in Europe throwing Athens under the bus to appease Turkey and Ukraine. Security is not semantics and Ankara as well as Kyiv are not North Macedonia, rendering this approach suicidal at worst and idiotic at best.
Second, Greece can lobby Washington to forge an independent relationship with Athens regardless of America’s ambivalence toward the rest of Europe. For instance, by conveying the importance that the base in Souda Bay, on the island of Crete, holds for Israel’s security.
In this scenario, there are two challenges. The first comes from Eastern Europe, which is likely to feel slighted by Athens’ unilateral approach to America. This has the potential to hurt Greece by compelling states like Poland and Finland to sideline Athens in favor of Turkey and Ukraine within Europe.
The second challenge relates to Israel. Instead of containing Turkey, this could backfire given Ankara’s growing rivalry with Jerusalem over Gaza and Syria. The last thing Greece needs is to become collateral damage in a conflict between Israel and Turkey, especially after avoiding a military confrontation with Ankara for the past century.
Third, Athens can support Turkey’s closer alignment with Europe. Greece is stronger with Europe than without it. This approach could provide Athens with the carrots and, therefore, the negotiating leverage required to resolve many of its outstanding differences with Ankara – including but not limited to the delimitation of the two countries’ maritime boundaries.
Even if I only outlined three scenarios, I think it would be wise for Greece to simulate these thought experiments through to their most logical conclusions.
America has unfortunately retreated from its role as leader of the Free World, making the international community even more dangerous and unpredictable. Europe and Turkey will likely seek closer ties as a result of Washington’s withdrawal. Greece must learn how to navigate this new balance of power, regardless of whether Athens likes it or not.
George Monastiriakos is a professor of law at the University of Ottawa.