Christos Sartzetakis was nominated for president by the socialist PASOK party in 1985, and served in that position until May 1990. [AP]
On the occasion of the non-re-election of Katerina Sakellaropoulou, Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis proposed the establishment of a six-year non-renewable term for the president of the Hellenic Republic. He thus prematurely opened the debate on the revision of the Constitution. But what is the aim of Mitsotakis’ proposal? And how powerful does our political system want the president to be?
Instead of another introduction to the subject, I will cite an incident from the first revision of the Constitution, that of 1985-1986. The then government of PASOK, with the assistance of the Communist Party of Greece (KKE) at the time, curtailed the “extensive powers” (as they were then called) of the president – that is, those which, according to the initial version of the current constitution, allowed him or her to intervene directly in political developments: Dissolve Parliament, call a referendum and dismiss the government. New Democracy, in opposition, had reacted strongly at the time, arguing that what PASOK was claiming – that popular sovereignty was supposedly being strengthened in this way – was untrue; the only thing that was being strengthened was the prime minister’s omnipotence.
However, after the election of Christos Sartzetakis as president, in a closed debate organized by the Association of Constitutional Scholars in the Parliament building, I realized that New Democracy did not actually mean what it was saying in public. As the debate intensified, I remember the distaste of a prominent member of its ranks: “Let’s not overdo it with the powers of the president. After all, we do not know who will be elected to this office tomorrow. Imagine Christos Sartzetakis […] on horseback, claiming that, according to the Constitution, he is the real leader of the armed forces!”
Needless to say, that debate ended in 1990, when former conservative premier Konstantinos Karamanlis was elected president for the second time, because by accepting the office with only nominal responsibilities, the originator of presidential “extensive powers” legitimized their curtailment.
Since then, no political party has supported the restoration of, if not all, at least some of the powers that had been taken away from the president. I am not referring so much to PASOK and the parties of the left that had opposed the powerful president from the very beginning, but to New Democracy, which completely forgot its earlier objections. Only a few backward-looking constitutional law professors have remained to warn of the danger that the ruling majority, as it governs without any safeguards, would resort to unlawful methods against the opposition and dissenters, in order to prolong its stay in power as long as possible.
In short, our political system wants the president to be powerless, so that the first party can govern unhindered. It only needs to achieve the magic number of 151 votes. In other words, it wants the president to function symbolically, rather than to “regulate the function of the institutions of the republic,” as the forgotten Paragraph 1 of Article 30 of the Constitution still states. I believe that the prime minister’s proposal for a six-year, non-renewable presidential term serves the same concept.
Let me first note that, apart from the American Constitution, which was revised in 1951 for this very purpose, most modern constitutions provide for a maximum term limit for the elected head of state. The avowed purpose of the relevant prohibition is to prevent abuses by leaders who have real and not merely nominal (as in our case) powers. Because what abuses can one expect from presidents without substantial power? For example, although their term of office is seven years, Italian presidents can be re-elected indefinitely.
Only eight constitutions in the world (out of a total of 211) currently provide for one term, of which the only European one is Malta’s. Ours will also be added to these, if Mitsotakis’ proposal is successful.
To justify this change, the government invoked the “innovative constitution” drafted in 2016 by a committee headed by former finance minister Stefanos Manos. However, this invocation is misleading, because the president’s position in the draft of this committee was completely different. In it, the president would act as a counterweight to the omnipotence of the ruling majority, having, among other things, the right to dissolve Parliament. All the more so since he would not be elected only by Parliament, but by a broader electoral body, in which mayors and regional governors would participate. Hence the provision for his non-re-election.
Of course, Mitsotakis invoked as a justification for his proposal the fact that the serving president would not be placed in an awkward position when he or she is not recommended for re-election. If this invocation was not made for circumstantial reasons (i.e. the non-renewal of Sakellaropoulou’s term) it is a sign of cynicism, which Mitsotakis usually avoids displaying. First of all, it is doubtful whether the new regulation would halt the endless chatter on the next president.
The main point, however, is this: Since, in view of the symbolic powers of the president, the prime ministerial proposal is not justified by the fear of abuses, one wonders whether – like the PASOK proposal for constitutional revision in 1985 – it is explained by only one reason: the further strengthening of the governing majority and more specifically of the prime minister. Because, since, as of 2019, even a small majority is sufficient for the election of the president, the non-renewable six-year term simply exempts the respective ruling party from the obligation to explain why it is not renewing the term of the serving president. Without much explanation, it will be able to appoint the president of its choice.
If this is true, Mitsotakis’ image as a reformist prime minister will be seriously damaged. Perhaps irreparably.
Nikos Alivizatos is a professor emeritus of constitutional law at Athens University.